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 Since the 1970s, the World Bank has been engaged in a project of neo-liberal 
economic reform and social change in the Egyptian countryside. These reforms have 
resulted in profound changes in the countryside, including loss of owned or rented 
land by smallholders due to impoverishment and social change. Though the effects of 
the World Bank's views have been seen in the countryside and in greater Egypt, the 
particular nature of these conceptions and how they affect policy remains obscure. 
Meanwhile, organizations such as the Land Center for Human Rights are conceptually 
and geographically closer to Egyptian farmers and provide a separate and distinct 
point of view that opposes the Bank. Therefore, the purpose of this project is to 
perform a discursive analysis of the views of the World Bank and the Land Center for 
Human Rights on land, education, and moral economy in Egypt in order to ascertain 
their effects on economic and social life in Egypt.
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 Since the 1970s, the World Bank has been engaged in a project of neo-liberal 
economic reform in Egypt. In these reforms, agriculture has received an intense focus. 
These reforms have resulted in profound changes in the countryside in Egypt, 
including land loss due to debt, impoverishment, and social change. However, these 
changes have been the result of particular views held by the Bank on land, education, 
and moral economy. Though the effects of the World Bank's views have been seen in 
the countryside and in greater Egypt, the particular nature of these conceptions and 
how they drive policy remain obscure. Organizations such as the Land Center for 
Human Rights are conceptually and geographically closer to Egyptian farmers and 
provide a separate and distinct point of view that opposes the Bank. Thus the Land 
Center provides a valuable counterpoint to the World Bank's views of agriculture in 
Egypt. The Land Center is valuable because it provides a conflicting view and a 
separate space where the Bank's views can be called into question. Therefore the 
purpose of this project is to perform a discursive analysis of the views of the World 
Bank and the Land Center for Human Rights on land, education, and moral economy 
in Egypt in order to ascertain the effects of these views economic and social life in 
rural Egypt. 
 Neo-liberal reforms in Egypt have produced vast changes in rural life over the 
past 30 years. Shifts in rural life have been tracked by others (Bush, 2007; Bach, 
1998; Toth, 1998), but the particular discipline the Bank seeks to impose on rural life 
by means of economic transformation has not been examined. As this thesis will 
show, the Bank seeks to impose this discipline in part by utilizing conceptions of land, 
education, and moral economy that differ from those held by organizations such as the 
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Land Center for Human Rights. Therefore, this thesis can also provide valuable 
insight into this new order and its relationship to agricultural changes in Egypt. 
 Egypt provides a good place to examine World Bank views because the 
situation in Egypt has been very well documented. The World Bank documents on its 
work in Egypt are extensive, as are Land Center publications and press releases. 
Moreover, there is a great deal of literature regarding agriculture in Egypt. Therefore 
the situation in Egypt provides a valuable place to study the World Bank's views on 
land, education, and moral economy, as well as effects of this policy. Agriculture in 
particular has received an intense focus by both the World Bank and social scientists, 
providing a great deal of information. Moreover, the way the Bank deals with 
knowledge has been discussed in other places (Goldman, 2001; Mehta, 2001).  
Nevertheless, the particular way the Bank views specific subjects and how these 
views drive policy objectives have not received much study. Moreover, land, 
education, and moral economy are not ideas or concepts exclusive to Egypt. 
Therefore, Egypt can provide a valuable case study showing how Bank conceptions 
and systems of knowledge drive World Bank policy. 
Methodology 
 Interviews, working papers, project reports, and policy documents from the 
World Bank and the Land Center for Human Right serve as raw data. These two sets 
of literature will be crosscut with literature from anthropologists, sociologists and 
economists that gives information on the ground. First, I will perform a literary 
analysis of the Bank documents and the Land Center documents to determine how the 
Bank and Land Center view land, education, and moral economy in the Egyptian 
countryside. Second, I will utilize data from sociologists, anthropologists, and 
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economists to show how the Bank's views affect policy in Egypt and the results of 
these policies. Finally, I will examine the places where Bank discourses collide with 
Land Center discourses and what the result of this collision is. 
Theoretical Framework 
Other Actors in the Mix: International Financial Institutions 
 It is important to note here that the World Bank is not the only institution 
engaged in the process of neo-liberal reform in Egypt. International financial 
institutions (IFIs) such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as well as the 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) also play a part. They 
have joined the World Bank in projects such as pushing for land titling, and they also 
have their own individual projects in the countryside. USAID is also an engine of US 
foreign policy, while the IMF and the World Bank have larger aims. Focusing on the 
World Bank has several benefits as well. First of all, the World Bank is one of the 
central players in the project for neo-liberal reform in Egypt. As such, it possesses key 
views that are worth examination. Moreover, the World Bank is capable, if it so 
chooses, of exerting pressure on the IMF and USAID to alter their policies in 
accordance with its wishes. The World Bank may or may not possess direct leadership 
over the IMF and USAID, but it does have enormous influence that can be utilized for 
good or ill. 
The World Bank as an Institution 
 The World Bank is a non-profit non-governmental organization founded in 
1944 at the Bretton Woods conference. Its original goal was to assist in the 
reconstruction of Europe after the end of World War II. Later on, the Bank began 
assisting countries in reconstruction after “natural disasters, humanitarian 
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emergencies, and postconflict rehabilitation” (World Bank: About Us, 2011). In the 
past 30 years the Bank refocused itself to engage in poverty reduction as well. The 
World Bank (World Bank: FAQ, 2010) consists of two organizations: the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Development 
Association. The International Development Association provides loans and grants to 
poorer nations, while the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
provides middle-income countries such as Egypt with loans, grants, and risk advisory 
and analytical services. The World Bank is run by the Board of Governors, the Board 
of Executive Directors, and the President of the Bank. Its membership consists of 187 
countries, each having a representative on the Board of Governors (World Bank: FAQ, 
2010). The Board of Executive Directors, in contrast, consists of the five top 
shareholders: the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Japan, 
along with a total of nineteen other members representing the remaining 182 
countries. The president of the Bank is always a United States national and is 
nominated by the Executive Director of the Bank (World Bank: FAQ, 2010). Hence 
the balance of power rests with the United States followed by the remaining four 
countries, those being Japan, the United Kingdom, Germany, and France. The 
remaining 182 member countries still have some power, but since they must select 19 
representatives from among themselves, they do not have nearly as much influence as 
the remaining five. This leaves the five nations on the executive council with a great 
deal of influence over World Bank policy. This is especially true of the United States, 
since the president of the World Bank is always a US national (World Bank FAQ, 
2010). 
 The Bank obtains its capital by selling AAA bonds on the international market. 
 5 
In addition, the Bank may call on up to $187 billion of capital from other countries, 
though it has never done so (World Bank: FAQ, 2010). However, its largest source of 
funding comes from a supply of capital replenished every three years from 40 
member countries (World Bank: FAQ, 2010). The Bank also receives interest on the 
loans it grants, generating further capital. The World Bank is thus a financial 
institution, but not in the sense that one can go to it and open an account. It sells 
bonds and gives out loans, but it is not a depository institution. Moreover, due to the 
apportionment of power within the Bank, the United States, Japan, United Kingdom, 
Germany, and France have a disproportionate say over the way the funds are 
distributed. Since loans are tied to development objectives, this disproportionate 
control enables these countries to enforce their policy interests on countries receiving 
these loans. Thus if the other 182 members wish to receive Bank loans they must 
often bend to the policy desires of the five major nations. 
 The World Bank's projects in Egypt began in the late 1970s under Anwar 
Sadat's infitah program. Early projects focused mostly on education. However, the 
financial crisis itself did not truly begin until the 1980s when remittances from the 
Gulf dried up, unemployment rose, and domestic inflation caused the government of 
Egypt to fall deeply into debt (Abdel-Khalek, 2002; p. 33). This financial crisis 
resulted in the Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Programme (ERSAP) 
(Abdel-Khalek, 2002; p. 33). At this time, the government of Egypt sought additional 
help from the Paris Club (Abdel-Khalek, 2002; p. 38-39), the World Bank, and other 
IFIs. This  period of structural adjustment has continued up until the present day and 
has focused intensely on agriculture. In the case of the World Bank, this focus has 
included policy changes, as well as projects dealing with irrigation, mechanization, 
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and education. Among others, the focus on agriculture has included a series of 
irrigation projects (World Bank, 2010; World Bank, 1994), and two projects in 
Marsah Matrouh (World Bank, 2003; World Bank, 2004A) and one in Sohag (World 
Bank, 2008). There have also been projects in the New Lands, as well as an aborted 
attempt at fish farming (World Bank, 1994). In the 1990s, the Bank backed Law 96 of 
1992, (World Bank, 1993; p. 32), ending input subsidies, and ceasing government 
purchase of crops such as wheat (World Bank, 1993; p. iii). In the 2000s, focus has 
turned towards irrigation and education projects. At present, few parts of rural life 
have not somehow been touched by Bank programs. 
The Land Center for Human Rights 
 The Land Center for Human Rights is a non-governmental and non-profit 
organization that was created in order to protect the rights of small farmers in Egypt.    
As such, it engages in advocacy with regard to land rights, human rights, education, 
and gender equality. It supports the interests of factory workers and agrarian laborers 
in the countryside. The Land Center provides small farmers with legal aid and also 
publishes periodic reports about land rights, human rights, and ongoing issues in the 
countryside. Its board consists of several professors from Cairo University as well as 
non-professionals. As an organization that advocates for Egyptian farmers, it is both 
conceptually and geographically closer to the interests and viewpoints of Egyptian 
farmers than is the World Bank. However, the Land Center is a small organization, 
and it is also marginal. Because its power and constituent base are derived from small 
farmers and workers, the Land Center does not possess a great deal of influence with 
the Egyptian government or the World Bank. However, the Land Center provides a 
viewpoint that is opposed to the World Bank and the government of Egypt. As such, it 
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can provide insight into Egyptian life that the World Bank does not possess. 
The Egyptian Government and the World Bank: Relationships of Opportunity 
 The Egyptian government has been cooperating with the World Bank and 
other financial institutions for the past 30 years in a project of neo-liberal reform.  
However, the nature of this cooperation bears examination. Some of the World Bank's 
policy initiatives have been fairly straightforward. Policies such as ending input 
subsidies (World Bank, 1993; p. iii) were performed with a simple stoppage of 
payment.  Despite possible effects on rural life, reforms such as ending input 
subsidies were passed so easily in large part because they bore little risk to the 
government of Egypt and they did not require a great deal of modification by the 
government in order to carry out. Large landowners could afford the change, and 
small farmers possessed little influence to stand in the way. Other reforms, such as 
land titling or privatization, bear closer examination.  
 In the process of privatization, control over many of the former government 
owned industries went to friends of the regime, and there is a reason for this action 
that goes beyond opportunity or greed. In a dictatorship, the dictator's first objective is 
to sustain his power. In order to do that, the dictator requires a coterie of surrounding 
people who help him maintain it. In return for their loyalty, the dictator provides 
benefits of various kinds such as lucrative business deals and other perks. So when the 
Bank backed privatization of government industries, the regime's inner circle was the 
first to benefit. This is not just because they were already managing many of these 
industries; as well, giving them the industries constituted a form of tribute that helped 
the government sustain itself. The president's inner circle and members of parliament 
got the businesses, and in turn, the president received their continued loyalty. This 
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opportunistic method of maintaining power is also seen in the government of Egypt's 
refusal to institute a tax on irrigation water. Not only does charging for water present a 
serious risk of unrest among small farmers, but the large businessmen that formed 
Sadat and Mubarak's inner circles would have to pay for it as well. The Bank, on the 
other hand, does not see this process take place.  
 The Bank's inattention to political realities is evident in other areas as well. 
For example, due to the particular way the reforms have taken place in Egypt, the 
income gap has increased. Nevertheless, in 2008, Egypt was given the “Reformer of 
the Year” award by the World Bank. The Bank sets out goals and directives, and as 
long as they are completed, it is content. It sees very little of the political 
considerations that have been made. Moreover, the Bank opportunistically backs laws 
that it sees as beneficial to itself. The Bank backed Law 96 of 1992, even though the 
law was not its idea nor a result of one of its directives. It did so because the Bank 
supports a land market, and Law 96, by allowing the removal of tenants from their 
land, created that possibility. That this did not happen as it had envisioned is a result 
of the particular opportunistic relationship that produced Law 96. The government of 
Egypt instituted Law 96 because the law allowed large landowners to reclaim their 
land from tenants and to charge higher rents, not because they wanted to sell land. 
Therefore, the government of Egypt may follow Bank advice or receive Bank support, 
but at the same time it may still be carrying out actions for different reasons and with 
different outcomes than the Bank would have wanted. The government cooperates, 
superficially, because it does need some support and because the Bank is a powerful 
institution. However, this cooperation is done in a way that benefits the government of 
Egypt, not the World Bank or even the Egyptian people. 
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Foucault, the World Bank, and the Many Modernities 
 As a whole, the World Bank is attempting to create a new order in Egypt. By 
instituting economic reforms based on neo-liberal ideas, it is changing the face of 
Egypt. Due to changing land laws and increasing income disparity (Fergany, 2002; p. 
211), farmers are being forced to migrate and change their lives in very particular 
ways based on the Bank's conception of discipline and order. Western life embodies a 
particular order of time and space based on a particular kind of discipline. The Bank 
backs land reform to cause consolidation, whether or not this actually occurs, while 
education creates a new kind of worker. It is a similar reordering of time and space 
that the Bank wishes to impose upon rural Egypt. However, the ultimate goal of this 
order remains unclear. The Bank seeks to alter perceptions of time and space to create 
a countryside that is more legible to the state and capitalist interests, yet the particular 
goal of this order has not been specified. Only vague conclusions can be drawn here. 
One of the reasons the Bank backed Law 96 of 1992 (World Bank, 1993; p. 32) was 
because of its desire to create a particular order in discipline and space. By altering 
the land laws so that rental was subject to market rates and no longer inheritable, Law 
96 could ideally free up land to be bought and sold more easily. Moreover, by also 
backing land registration, the Bank seeks to make land more visible to the state and to 
capitalist interests. In a very graphic fashion, the Bank is seeking to impose a new 
regime of space upon the countryside. The land registration move, in combination 
with the increased price of inputs and new investments that smallholders are expected 
to pay accomplishes a new order as well. Under the new conditions a great many 
people are able to sell their land, and in combination with the changes Law 96 
imposed on tenure, it becomes possible to dispossess a large number of smallholders, 
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though whether or not mass dispossession is actually occurring is unclear. Yet many 
small farmers have been pushed into full-time wage labor, whether it is farm labor, 
factory work, construction, or something else entirely. They collect paychecks and are 
integrated into a new style of life that is reflective of the Bank's Western idea of social 
order (Foucault, 1982). However, this is not a case of modernity being imposed on 
tradition. If the Bank's order is neo-liberal capitalism, then the Egyptian economy is in 
a state of transition. This transition is not from tradition to modernity, but from state 
capitalism to neo-liberal capitalism. Egypt is transitioning from one form of 
capitalism to another more dominant form. 
 In addition to discipline, Michel Foucault also deals extensively with discourse 
and its connection to power (Foucault, 1982). There are many competing discourses 
in the development of Egypt, but the ones that concern this thesis are those of the 
World Bank and the Land Center. These discourses are comprised of the literature of 
the World Bank and the Land Center for Human Rights. The Bank discourses have 
been created by the conjunction of a number of wealthy and powerful relationships. 
The Land Center discourses, being constituted via power relationships of small 
farmers and the interest of the Land Center itself, hold much less power. Therefore, 
the conjunction of power and resistance constituted by the meeting of these two 
discourses is much less obvious. The Land Center discourses could be seen as a form 
of resistance, but because they are overwhelmed by the power of Bank discourses, the 
Bank's voice remains dominant. As such, the Land Center provides a voice in the 
wilderness and a counterpoint, but it is not necessarily a powerful site of resistance. 
The World Bank and Systems of Knowledge 
 In recent times, the Bank has set itself up as both an arbiter and storehouse of 
 11 
knowledge. However, this knowledge comes in a particular form. In the Bank's 
conception, knowledge is colonial, hegemonic, technocratic, Durkheimian, and 
economic.  
 The hegemonic nature of the Bank's regime of knowledge is starkly 
reminiscent of that of the old colonial powers. An example here can be seen in the 
Bank's efforts to build a dam in Laos. The Bank offered consultants “high salaries, 
unique research opportunities, and access to formerly impenetrable societies and 
research sites” (Goldman, 2001; p. 8), in exchange for rapid reports of basic social 
facts. The consultants told stories of discovering new languages, camping in the 
jungle, and being ferried about in helicopters. Such a regime of knowledge production 
is not only distinctly colonial, but disturbingly military. The Bank returns 
anthropology firmly to the “savage slot” described by Trouillot (1991; 24-25) by 
reifying notions of untouched places and primitive cultures. Moreover, it returns 
anthropology to its original colonial purpose: to understand cultures in order to 
dominate them.  
 The Bank has also been charged with suppressing reports that it found 
disagreeable. Despite the Bank's contention that these cultures were previously 
untouched, the same report tells of self-described “fish heads” who had been living in 
these areas for years among these supposedly “untouched” peoples. These Western 
ichthyologists had been studying fish species (Goldman, 1998; p. 198-199). 
Moreover, as the situation with the ichthyologists in Laos demonstrates, reports that 
disagree with Bank goals are often suppressed or simply not circulated (Goldman, 
1998; p. 198-199). 
 The Bank's conception of knowledge is hegemonic in that it overpowers most 
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other forms of knowledge in the places where it operates. Moreover, it is backed by 
the particular interests of those who create it. Private enterprises have a great deal of 
incentive to support certain kinds of knowledge and suppress others because they 
benefit greatly from World Bank projects. Poorer nations tend to accept this regime 
because it is tied to a great deal of money and political pressure. Hence the hegemony 
of the Bank's knowledge is supported by both money and power.  
 The Bank sees knowledge as a public good that is both non-rivalrous and non-
excludable (World Bank, 1998; p. 16). As such, the possession of knowledge by one 
person does not preclude another person from possessing it. Once knowledge has 
been put into the public domain, anyone can use it. Despite these laudable goals 
however, the Bank does not consider that the ability to access and use knowledge is 
tied to the possession of the wealth needed to reach those sources. The Bank fails to 
anticipate the proposal that knowledge might not exist on an open market and that it is 
not free of the circumstances of its production. Instead, the Bank believes that 
knowledge stands above the real and can be accessed by anyone. This view of 
knowledge is, rather paradoxically, structurally platonic because the Bank has set 
itself up as the arbiter of development knowledge. In Plato's republic, only the King 
had true knowledge (Williams, 2001; p. 43). The King's “true knowledge” are the 
Bank's ideas. Accessing this knowledge and bringing it into the real only corrupted it. 
The King's closest confidants were meant to disseminate knowledge, and his soldiers 
provided knowledge with power (Williams, 2001; p. 43). The people's job was simply 
to follow that knowledge, however impure it was by the time it reached them. By 
following knowledge, they achieved enlightenment. In the Republic, the common 
people never really understood, they only followed orders. The Bank's role as the 
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storehouse of enlightenment in knowledge, is therefore, to disseminate knowledge, 
through which others may follow and gain a portion of enlightenment. This is an 
extremely hegemonic and positivistic conception of knowledge that brooks no 
dissidence.   
 Knowledge is generated when anthropologists and sociologists are hired to do 
very rapid assessments using questionable research methodologies such as Rapid 
Rural Appraisal (Goldman, 2001; p. 8). The goal of rapid rural appraisal is to 
“extract” (Goldman, 2001; p. 8) knowledge for the Bank's use. It is done in a short 
time frame, and it implies a distinctly Durkheimian conception of knowledge. Under 
Durkheim's conception, each society possessed a series of social facts that could be 
known about it (Durkheim, 1895). As such, knowledge was largely static and not 
subject to change. This kind of knowledge is what the Bank seeks, and it is reflected 
in its reports. In the second Matrouh project, a laundry list of reputed “social facts” is 
given about the Bedouin. Clan and subclan structures are described, as is the 
transhumance of the Bedouin. Since social facts are conceived of as largely static, this 
allows for the reification of rather racist stereotypes, such as when the Bank states that 
the Bedouin tendency towards eating little and transhumance may be “genetic” 
(World Bank, 2004A; p. 145).  
 The Bank's understanding of knowledge is also technocratic. As such, their 
reports are highly technical and economically oriented. This technocratic viewpoint is 
in line with a particular point of view based on the achieving of economic goals. The 
Bank sees high technology as the answer to ground-level development. The Bank 
repeatedly refers to the process of development as “modernization.” Since modernity 
is often equated with high technology, in Egyptian agriculture, modernization means 
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advocating and funding the use of advanced agricultural technologies and 
understandings (World Bank, 1993; p. 81). Farmers are taught technical skills and 
technical viewpoints because technical knowledge is valued by the Bank above all 
other forms of knowledge. 
Neo-Liberalism and the Chicago School 
 The Bank utilizes a perspective called neo-liberalism. Specifically, the 
philosophy of neo-liberalism argues that the market does not need intervention of any 
kind (Mudge, 2008; p. 715). As a result of this perspective, the Bank advocates 
offloading risk onto individuals rather than corporations or governments. Various 
forms of government intervention are criticized by the Bank, including input subsidies 
(World Bank, 1993; p. 62), tariffs (World Bank, 1993; p. 45), and price controls 
(World Bank, 1993; p. 3). Neo-liberal ideologies encourage no economic intervention 
at all levels of government, and privatization is encouraged for government industries 
(Mudge, 2008; p. 704) and portions of public education (Mudge, 2008; p. 704). In 
Egypt, this de-regulation includes, among other things, removing social safety nets 
such as agricultural input subsidies (World Bank, 1993; p. 62) and floor prices for 
crops (World Bank, 1993; p. 62).  
 Neo-liberalism advocates a level of market freedom that most wealthier 
nations do not follow. Western states routinely protect industries they view as 
strategic, including farming. The Bank engaged in neoliberal reform in Egypt in the 
midst of major failure elsewhere. Arguably, decreased government regulation caused 
the mortgage crisis in the United States in 2008 and subsequent crises in Europe. 
Government de-regulation in the manner the Bank advocates allowed banks to give 
mortgages to those who could not afford them and then allowed those mortgages to be 
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re-packaged and sold in complex and incomprehensible ways that intentionally 
avoided regulation. Instead of purchasing insurance, mortgages were packaged into 
unregulated derivatives. Then when people could not pay for the mortgages, the 
derivatives failed and the system collapsed. Non-intervention paved the way for a 
crisis that is now sweeping the entire globe. As Marx predicted, capitalism has moved 
from crisis to crisis. The failure of a number of large banks and hedge funds and the 
subsequent US government bailout caused panic and the crisis swept the globe for 
reasons that are still not well understood. Such events throw into question the entire 
Bank strategy. If the recent financial crisis based on government de-regulation is any 
indication, then de-regulation bodes ill for governments such as Egypt that are 
following the Bank's example.  
 Indeed, political instability is often the ultimate result. It would be both 
premature and an oversimplification to blame the wave of revolutions that swept the 
Middle East in 2011 entirely on economic distress, yet it does play a part. More 
accurately, the poor feel a loss of dignity not least because many of them were not 
always so poor. The Bank's emphasis on large land ownership plays no small part in 
the impoverishment of Egypt. Having rightfully owned land taken away is more than 
an economic loss, it is an indignity that has not been idly suffered. Ex-farmers 
shuffled off to the slums of Cairo played their part in the revolution as well, as did 
people who came directly from the countryside to participate (Bush, 2011). 
Phenomenology: Seeing through the eyes of the Bank and the Land Center 
Phenomenology is essential for understanding the contested spaces that the 
Bank and Land Center for Human Rights occupy. In order to propose that meanings 
can be contested, it must first be acknowledged that meaning is public (Jackson, 1996; 
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p. 2-3). Ideas themselves do not stand above empirical reality, but rather are integrated 
into it (Jackson, 1996; p. 2-3). Ideas are made and shaped by people and are a part of 
their reality (Jackson, 1996 p. 2-3). To treat ideas as outside or above reality is to be 
unable to fully understand them. That said, in no sense does this mean that everyone 
has to agree on these meanings. Indeed, contested meanings are part and parcel of life 
and make up the discourses that shape our world. Jackson's emphasis in 
phenomenology is on lifeworlds, or the discursive spaces in which people live 
(Jackson, 1996; p. 15-17). In lifeworlds, people share meanings, agree on things 
publicly (Jackson, 1996; p. 15-17), and problematize life in certain ways (Berger and 
Luckman, 1966; p. 24). Further, phenomenology points out that even though we often 
assume we share our lifeworld with others, we do not always share quite the same 
lifeworld (Berger and Luckman, 1966; p. 46). Hence we conceptualize things in very 
different ways. Development experts at the World Bank exist in different lifeworlds 
than of Egyptian farmers. World Bank experts do not live in the countryside or work 
in the fields. Most of them live well, and they do not struggle to make ends meet in 
the way that farmers do. I do not intend to paint development experts as bloated 
bureaucrats who live in the lap of luxury. Nevertheless, it is necessary to point out that 
without a real crossing of lifeworlds, it is difficult to reach a mutual understanding of 
concepts such as land, moral economy or tradition, and education. World Bank 
policies are formed by individuals who do not inhabit the same lifeworlds as the Land 
Center activists or Egyptian farmers. 
Sharing lifeworlds is not all the phenomenological approach entails. The need 
to understand how people problematize is critical to understanding not just what 
individuals see as problems, but also how they go about dealing with them. For 
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example, for years many people in the countryside have lived just above the margins. 
Yet in 2006 and 2007, the Tagammu party organized large-scale protests over living 
conditions in the countryside (Bush, 2007; p. 10). Granted, there was a drastic change 
in living conditions after 1992, but this does not necessarily explain why years of 
baseline poverty did not incite public protest prior to 1992. There have been other 
protests, but they did not relate to land or quality of life. To understand this 
phenomenon, it pays to know how the poor in the Egyptian countryside problematize 
their world. Scott calls this a “subsistence ethic” or moral economy (Scott, 1976; p. 3-
4) and argues that more often than not, people living close to the margin will take a 
steady paycheck over a risky venture (Scott, 1976; p. 35). For the poor, losing on a 
risky venture means they lose everything. It also means that the poor develop mutual 
support systems which are meant to shelter each other in hard times. An example of 
this is the Hoka work system in Zimbabwe, where workers meet on Fridays at another 
person's land to help them (Bessant and Muringai, 1993; p. 2), and another example is 
communal bread-making in Egypt, where the women of a village get together to make 
bread (Mitchell, 2002; p. 262).  
Moreover, the moral economy thesis argues that rebellion takes place when 
sudden shocks take place that violate custom (Scott, 1976; p. 193-194). Though 
protest was ongoing for various reasons for many years, the 2006 protests in Dakhalia 
can be seen as a response the shock of structural adjustment and the subsequent 
violations of cultural norms.  
However, this alone leaves us with a far too simplistic picture. First of all, 
protesting this particular set of economic conditions is new, even while protest is not. 
Moreover, Scott's argument stresses that the rural poor have many networks of 
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support and that before rebellion takes place, these have to have been exhausted. The 
incidents of public protest in 2006 in Dakhalia implied a breakdown of the moral 
economy itself. Due to smallholders losing their land, rising rents, dropping subsidies, 
and diminishment of food security in general, normal methods of dealing with crisis 
failed. Public and private shaming, rumors, means of quiet encroachment (Bayat, 
2009; p. 56), and even physical retaliation against landlords proved insufficient to 
deal with the new problems. Moreover, public and private means of supporting one 
another failed as well. Farmers increasingly had to leave their fields to find work 
elsewhere (Bach, 1998; p. 187), and the need for ever more money to achieve basic 
subsistence meant they had reserve money, which put strains on the old moral 
economy. Hence, the rebellion involved in the large-scale protests organized by the 
Tagammu' party (Bush, 2007; p. 9) was a result of the breakdown of the moral 
economy in many regions.  
A moral economy changes with time and operates within a web of 
relationships. When this web changes, the moral economy must also. The poor do not 
see their poverty as a problem necessarily. They do not problematize it as such. 
However, losing what little they have is a problem and requires a re-orientation of 
life-worlds and a restructuring of moral economies.  
 Yet the Bank conceptualizes the practices of a moral economy, such as 
traditional cropping methods and risk management, as inefficient and problematic 
(World Bank, 1993; p. 33), arguing that they are not suited for a free market. 
Meanwhile other practices slip by unnoticed by the Bank despite their importance. Yet 
conceptually it makes perfect sense to be reluctant to give up security. Taking risks is 
a good option only if there is a way to mitigate them, and moral economy is a way of 
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mitigating risk. 
Consequently a phenomenological study of everyday life offers valuable 
insight into the ontology and epistemology of both the Land Center for Human Rights 
and the World Bank. Phenomenology can illuminate not only how these groups go 
about implementing and dealing with policies, but also how they problematize rural 
life. 
Co-Temporality and Social Analysis 
 Co-temporality states that all people live in the same time as one another 
(Fabian, 1983). The importance of this concept can only be seen in light of its 
historical context. In early colonial times, European explorers described and analyzed 
the social formations they encountered. Explorers argued that local peoples were 
living in the past and that what they really needed was to be modern and “civilized” 
(Fabian, 2000 p. 183). The problem for this project lies in that the same discourse still 
abounds today. Anthropology as we know it was founded later as a salvage operation, 
to record the lives of vanishing and primitive peoples (Trouillot, 1991; p. 24-25). This 
perspective becomes important to the study of rural peoples because an examination 
of the discourse reveals that urbanity is all too often associated with civilization and 
Western life, while rural living is primitive, passive, and ignorant. In order to 
understand anything besides the urban, we must place the countryside in the proper 
time and space, that is, with the rest of us and not from 1000 years into the past. Co-
temporality is critical to the success of development because it allow us to see the 
subjects of development as human beings and not primitives. Hence I posit that 
Egyptian farmers are actors and collaborators, not passive objects to be acted on. 
 Sadly, an examination of a great deal of the discourse on the countryside 
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makes clear that co-temporality is something that rural dwellers are not often 
accorded. There is a veritable genealogy of images of a mythical Egyptian peasant, 
living as he has for the past 6,000 years. Much of the discourse, as Timothy Mitchell 
(1990; p. 3) points out, has a long history in which Henri Ayrout (Ayrout, 2005) plays 
a large part. Originally published in 1938, Ayrout's work is considered a classic. 
However, despite its acknowledged and widely held historical value, the book itself 
contains a full-fledged denial of co-temporality. Ayrout argues that Egyptian peasants 
have lived the way they do since the time of the Pharaohs. He also argues that every 
village is exactly alike (Ayrout, 2005; p. 89). Ayrout seemed to believe that by 
stepping into the countryside, he was living in the past. Yet Ayrout's work forms a part 
of a discourse about peasants upon which development experts continue to draw. 
 The influence of Ayrout's work and peasant discourse can be seen in the 
discussions surrounding market reforms and Law 96. When Egyptians and 
international organizations were discussing market reform in the early 1990s, the head 
of the World Bank said that “the concept of the market is foreign to the Egyptian 
farmer” (Bush, 2002; p. 17). When Law 96 was being discussed, the Egyptian media 
and elites portrayed farmers as “traditional”, which implied that they were lazy, 
passive, and untrustworthy (Saad, 2002; p. 109). The lack of co-temporality is made 
all the more difficult by the World Bank's reluctance to deal directly with farmers. 
Reports such as the World Bank's Agricultural Plan for the 1990s (World Bank, 1993; 
p. vii) are compiled without visiting local farms. Instead, the Bank relies on reports 
from other projects in which they deal primarily with government officials, not 
farmers. This gap in understanding can be difficult to mend unless the Bank is willing 
to engage farmers directly, or at the very least to read something besides Ayrout's 
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work or its many derivatives.  
Peasants, Farmers and the Countryside: Competing Definitions 
 The countryside is not a bounded entity, but a region that has been discursively 
defined by those in power. It is a varied and heterogeneous series of places where 
agriculture is carried out, mostly outside of Cairo. There is constant movement 
between the countryside itself and Cairo (Toth, 1998; p. 67). People travel routinely 
from the Oases or the Delta to Cairo and other administrative centers. Cairo is the 
administrative center for the country. Many services cannot be obtained nor can many 
disputes with the government be resolved without a visit to Cairo. The countryside is 
also incredibly varied. Differences in economic, social, and political circumstances 
abound, particularly between the Oases, the Sa'id, and the Delta regions. Hence, the 
countryside is neither a monolithic nor a bounded entity. 
 The idea of a peasant, or fellah, as it is known in Egypt, is tied up in a number 
of discourses and assumptions, and it does not often address the fact that Egyptian 
rural-dwellers may not be peasants at all. However, in order to understand the history, 
the conceptions what a peasant or fellah is will be discussed here. As noted before, the 
concept of fellahin features prominently in the discourses of the Egyptian 
government, NGO workers, and academics. Yet it is a problematic conceptual 
category at best.  
 The first of these  arguments is of a “peasant essentialism” (Bernstein, 2006; p. 
401). Peasant essentialism assumes that peasants have a singular, timeless, and 
unchanging essence (Bernstein, 2006; p. 401). Such an assumption implies that all 
peasants are really the same, no matter what place, time, or circumstances that they 
may live in. The problem with essences is that they cannot be defined and that they 
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unfairly box people into a category. Peasant essentialism allows for an exceedingly 
narrow scope of inquiry.  
 Another assumption made is that peasants are “tied to the land” and that this 
tie is the source of a peasant's timeless essence (Ayrout, 2005; p. xvii). Therefore, as 
the Earth is changeless, so are the fellahin. Yet peasants are not, in fact, tied to the 
land, as history in the 19
th
 century and onward has shown. According to a number of 
sources, peasants, if that is what we assume they are, can and do leave the land and 
move elsewhere. This movement may be caused by economic circumstances (Bush, 
2002, p. 194; Mitchell, 2002, 157 p. ; Toth, 1998, p. 67), governmental edict (Bush, 
2002; p. 194), or simply a desire for something else (Bach, 1998; p. 187), but peasants 
do move, and there is a constant flow of people to and from the cities and in broader 
circuits as well. 
 Perhaps it is better to ask if people who live in the countryside were ever 
peasants at all. At this point a definition of peasant is needed. According to Weber, 
class is defined by market position  (Weber, 1914; p. 248). Therefore, peasants as a 
class should be identified by the particular set of relations that defines their market 
position. In contrast, according to Marx, peasants were defined by their productive 
relations in Europe with a feudal lord (Marx, 1906; p. 515). They were serfs under 
this lord, and lived on his land. They grew food, of which they gave a portion of to the 
lord of the estate. Furthermore, agriculture was based on subsistence and was carried 
out by the family unit. Peasants also occasionally served in the armies. In exchange, 
the lord provided protection, seed, clothing, and materials. There was very little 
exchange of money. A more recent, yet still somewhat incomplete definition argues 
that peasants are those who are engaged in agriculture for their own subsistence 
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(Wolf, 1969). A more complete definition of peasant labor is provided by  Trouillot, 
who says that peasants are defined through “an institutionalized process through 
which a household performs agricultural labor on a unit over which it exerts a form of 
control that excludes other groups, with instruments of work which it also controls in 
an exclusive manner which generally represent less of an input than the labor itself” 
(Trouillot, 1988; p. 4). Nevertheless, even by the broadest definition, Egyptian rural 
dwellers are not and were not, even prior to the 1950s, peasants at all. 
 Prior to the 1950s, the countryside was organized into something known as the 
'izbah system. This system began developing in the 19
th
 century and lasted until the 
1952 revolution when the Free Officers took power (Richards, 1980; p. 6). Rural 
dwellers lived on an 'izbah and worked for the owner of the estate (Richards, 1980; p. 
5). However, the system of relations on an 'izbah was very different from that of the 
European peasantry or in Trouillot's definition. Like the European peasantry of the 
15
th
 century, workers on an 'izbah did not own their own land, but rather worked on 
the owner's land (Richards, 1980; p. 5). They did own their tools, but they were not 
engaged in subsistence labor in a household unit. Instead, they were engaged in wage 
labor. They were sometimes allowed small plots of their own, but their chief means of 
income were the wages paid either in cash or in kind by the owner of the 'izbah 
(Richards, 1980; p. 5). Since they did not own the means of production, and the only 
thing which they had to sell was their labor, 'izbah workers were proletarians, not 
peasants. After the 1950 revolution, agricultural reform was begun under Mohammed 
Naguib and continued under Abdel-Nasser (Bush, 2002; p. 9). The 'izbahs were split 
up, and a land ownership cap was set in order to break the power of the large 
landowners in the country. The cap was set at 200 feddans per individual, and 300 
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feddans per family (Bush, 2002; p. 9), a feddan being roughly equal to an acre. The 
land cap was later reduced to 200 feddans per family. The newly expropriated land 
was then redistributed to the poor (Bush, 2002; p. 9). Despite loopholes that allowed 
many large landowners to keep much of their land, (Bush, 2002; p. 23) the 
redistribution of land simultaneously did two things: it de-proletarianized the 
countryside, and it created a class of smallholders. These new smallholders were 
farmers, not peasants. 
 Moreover, Egyptian rural-dwellers are not solely engaged in farming, but also 
in  a vast web of relationships (Abdel Aal, 2002; p. 143) both inside and outside of 
their home villages and cities. Given the current emphasis on selling crops and the 
fact that rural dwellers do, in fact, now sell much of what they have grown, rural 
dwellers are no longer solely engaged in subsistence activities. This market 
engagement occurs in spite of the turn towards subsistence in wheat production and 
other basics noted by Mitchell (2002; p. 250) following the passing of Law 96. 
Moreover, the household unit is not the sole force of labor utilized by small farmers. 
Rural dwellers now commonly engage in wage labor in both in their home villages 
and abroad to make ends meet. It is not uncommon for a young man to leave the 
village and agricultural work for years at a time in order to earn enough money to pay 
for a wedding (Bach, 1998 p. 67). In fact, 40 percent of income in the countryside 
comes from working abroad or the city rather than from farming itself (Adams, 2001; 
p. 10). Given that much of agriculture in Egypt is no longer chiefly devoted towards 
subsistence and may never have been in the first place, and that the household is no 
longer the primary means of production, Egyptian rural dwellers cannot be called 
peasants, but are rather farmers.  
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 The issue of rural dwellers as farmers needs to be taken up both before and 
after Law 96. But first, a definition of a farmer is required. Wolf defines farmers as 
those who are engaged in the practice of agriculture for a market economy (Wolf, 
1969). Between 1963 and the 1980s, the economy of Egypt was dominated by a form 
of state-run capitalism (Mitchell, 2002; p. 280). Almost all of the major industries in 
Egypt were owned by the government (Mitchell, 2002; p. 8), and agriculturalists in 
Egypt were required to sell major crops such as wheat, sugarcane, and cotton crops to 
the government and government-controlled corporations (World Bank, 1993; p. 9). 
Hence, prior to 1992, Egypt was not engaged in a pre-capitalist system of relations, 
but rather a different form of capitalism instituted by Abdel-Nasser in the 1950s.  In 
the 1980s Egypt underwent an economic crisis. In response, the Egyptian government 
turned to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Bush, 2002; p. 
11). The international financial institutions lent Egypt money and restructured its 
debts in exchange for neo-liberal reforms (Bush, 2002; p. 11). These reforms and the 
neo-liberal ideas that directed them were predicated on “opening up” the system to 
capitalism. The reforms required Egypt to remove certain import tariffs, to cap other 
tariffs, to transfer state-owned businesses to private ownership, and to remove 
subsidies (Abdel-Khalek, 2002; p. 35). These subsidies included fertilizers, bread, 
sugar, oil, and flour (Korayem, 2001; p. 70). The state also ceased buying most crops 
from rural growers at set rates, fully exposing them to the vagaries and price 
fluctuations of the world marketplace (World Bank, 1993; p. 9). Egyptian rural 
dwellers are farmers fully engaged in the production of agriculture geared towards a 
market economy. Therefore since the 1950s, Egyptian rural dwellers have been 
farmers. At the same time, given their work outside the farm to make ends meet 
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(Bach, 1998, p. 187; Toth, 1998, p. 67), rural dwellers can also be seen as semi-
proletarians. 
Mass Production and the Forces of Rationalization 
 For the purposes of this illustration, we will refer to wheat and its derivative 
flour. In order to mass produce and consume any crop, several things are required.  
Two of the demands of mass production are consistency and quantity. Consistency 
demands that each bag of flour bought off the shelf be the same as any other. Gluten 
content must be stable. In other words, if water is added, the response of the flour 
should be the same each time. This facilitates bread baking in that one can rely upon 
the measurements for each batch of bread to be close to identical to ensure that the 
final product is of a consistent quality. Therefore quality must be strictly controlled, 
and the same cultivars of wheat in the same proportions must be contained in each 
batch of flour. Growers are held responsible for quality control. If the wheat they 
produce is unsatisfactory, they cannot sell it to be made into flour. Quality control can 
be difficult for a small farmer or peasant, because a bad year or an unsatisfactory crop 
can be devastating to their finances, as can the inputs required to produce this quality 
of wheat and cultivar of wheat.  
 The second demand of mass production is quantity. A great deal of wheat must 
be produced to satisfy demand. Producers are often required to grow the same cultivar 
of wheat year after year and season after season in the same plot without rotation. 
Certain weeds, pests, and diseases are native to wheat (Gardner, 2001; p. 166-177, 
207). If the wheat crop is not rotated out, these weeds, pests, and diseases must be 
treated with increasing amounts of fertilizer, pesticide, and herbicide. The problem 
here, known as lodging (Shiva, 1991; p. 36) is that local cultivars, or land races, 
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cannot deal with this problem well, since wheat land races grow tall, fall over, and die 
(Shiva, 1991; p. 36). The solution proffered by development experts is to utilize 
genetically engineered crops such as those promulgated by Norman Borlaug in the 
Green Revolution (Shiva, 1991; p. 63). Yet the patents and rights to these seeds are 
owned by multinational seed companies (Shiva, 1991; p. 63). By contract, farmers are 
not allowed to reuse seed from previous years even if they are collected. This places 
further financial burden on small farmers. Of course, the combined effect of 
fertilizers, pesticides, and herbicides acidifies and wears out soil over time, leading to 
the need for ever more resistant and expensive cultivars of wheat. The result of this 
process is soil degradation and bankrupt small farmers (Shiva, 1991; p. 176).  Their 
land is then bought up or repossessed by larger farmers and organizations more 
capable of absorbing the financial shock and controlling quality. 
 The purpose of development is to draw economies in the periphery further into 
national and international economies (Long, 1977; p. 4). Therefore agricultural 
development, despite its noble aims, often plays a part in rationalization. Larger 
organizations and states, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World 
Bank, the government of Egypt, and USAID are deeply involved in development and 
hence are also implicated in the process of rationalization. In Egypt in particular there 
has been an intense focus on agricultural reform and development (Bush, 2002; p. 4). 
The agricultural sector constituted 25 percent of Egypt's export earnings in 1993 
(World Bank, 1993; p. 5), yet many crops are able to be consumed only locally, and 
other products such as wheat, must be imported.  
While scholars such as Timothy Mitchell have argued that the point of land 
reform in Egypt was to place farmers into factories (Mitchell, 2002; p. 266), the 
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evidence for this assertion is thin. Though in other countries there may have been a 
push for industrialization, there is no evidence that Egypt has followed suit. 
Rationalization and land consolidation have played a part in neo-liberal reform, but a 
desire for this particular outcome has not been expressed by the World Bank. 
Moreover, the World Bank's projects in Egypt do not display this kind of direction. 
There is not a series of land reforms followed by factory construction and education, 
but rather a series of land reforms followed by education in no specific direction. If 
rationalization has taken place, it is a result of a Western desire for services, not 
factories. It is easier to contract work out to large companies rather than to 
individuals, and Egypt has expertise in several areas such as construction and tourism. 
Conclusions 
 In this chapter, I introduced the problem of my thesis and laid out my 
methodology. I discussed the Land Center for Human Rights and the World Bank as 
institutions.  I also laid out the theoretical framework for my thesis. In future chapters, 
I will discuss the Bank's and the Land Center's views of land, moral economy, and 
education. I will then offer some conclusions and suggestions for a way forward. 
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 In this chapter I propose that the World Bank views land as a commodity and a 
means of production. I present the Land Center's more expansive view of land as 
including heritage, authenticity, and a legacy. Afterwards, I critique the Bank view of 
land and discuss the relationship between the Bank and Land Center views of land. I 
also address the results of this collision. Lastly, I offer some conclusions as to the 
ongoing effects of this process of collision such as changed rental practices and the 
possibility of land consolidation. 
Land as a Means of Production 
 The Bank sees land as a means of production. This view of land means that 
within Bank discourse, land is treated much like a factory. Workers come in on a daily 
basis to work for the landowner. The landowner eventually harvests the crops and 
pays his workers. Profits are generated from the crop sale, which are then reinvested 
into the enterprise. Hence farmers are expected to use capital generated from the farm 
to reinvest in irrigation, education, the purchase of more land, and new technology. 
This constant reinvestment produces ever-higher returns, which are then trickled 
down to workers in the form of higher wages.  
 Though the Bank realizes that smallholders are in need of “social safety nets” 
(World Bank, 1993; p. iv) and do not  fit the model just described, it still treats 
smallholders as capitalists by expecting them to do without input subsidies (World 
Bank, 1993; p. 71) and reinvest heavily into their land in the form of irrigation 
projects (World Bank, 1993; p. iv) and new technologies. In the policy document Arab 
Republic of Egypt: World Bank Agricultural Plan for the 1990s in particular, this 
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reinvestment into irrigation is discussed openly:  
“Given the limitations on the Government's ability to meet fully the O&M costs,it is 
important that the farmers contribute more towards meeting these costs.”  (World 
Bank, 1993; p. iv). 
Here the Bank argues that the state is unable to pay for the full cost of operation and 
maintenance (O&M) for irrigation reform, so small farmers must take some of the 
costs (World Bank, 1993; p. iv). These costs are estimated to be 3-6% of revenue, and 
said to be   “not a significant impact on net farm incomes.” (World Bank, 1993; p. iv). 
This is because smallholders are seen as bourgeois engaged in the production of 
capital. An illustration of this perspective can be seen in the Bank's scheme for paying 
for irrigation water (World Bank, 1993; p. 86-87). The Bank believes that businesses 
should pay for water use. Since  farmers are assumed to be engaged in business and 
thus possess and generate capital, the Bank is able to justify its scheme. 
Land as a Commodity 
 The Bank sees land as a commodity that can be bought, sold, and rented at 
market rates. The Bank's opposition to restrictions on land sales and support of Law 
96 of 1992 is evidence of this view. Though Law 96 was not the Bank's idea, the Bank 
supported Law 96 of 1992, calling it a “step in the right direction.” (World Bank, 
1993; p. 32). Law 96 repealed the tenancy laws put in place by Abdel Nasser. The 
reason for the Bank's support of Law 96 is that tenancy restricted sale and state-
regulated rental prices were too low (World Bank, 1993; p. 32). Landowners could not 
sell rented land unless an agreement was reached with the tenant (Bush, 2002; p. 20). 
In the absence of an agreement, the land was simply transferred with the tenant intact 
(Saad, 2002; p. 105). Because of the difficulty, rented land was not often sold and 
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could not easily be commoditized. Moreover, owners were reluctant to rent out more 
land because artificially regulated rent rates were so low, and if more than a year 
passed, tenants could claim permanent tenure under the law. Hence landowners had 
various incentives to keep their holdings stable.  
 Land registration was a key part of the effort to commoditize land. Much of 
the arable land in Egypt is unregistered or registered to someone who is now dead 
(Bush, 2002; p. 20), a situation that is due to  several factors. First, the government 
registration process is long and ponderous, and many small farmers have neither the 
time nor money to go through it (Bush, 2002; p. 20). Second, people have also moved 
onto state-owned land, built houses, and cultivated it as well (Land Center, 2002; p. 
135). Finally, the entire process of registration presents a dilemma because the official 
land records are not accurate. Land ownership is maintained locally through collective 
memory, squatter rights, and out of date records. Therefore, land is commoditized 
through reform. In order to commoditize land, the Bank has pushed for  land 
registration and supported Law 96 of 1992. 
A Critique of Land as a Means of Production 
 From an economic perspective, land is a means of production and a 
commodity. Ironically, this perspective places small farmers squarely into the ranks of 
the bourgeoisie, as owners of the means of production. As such farmers are expected 
to behave as capitalists, making the most efficient and capitalistic use of the resources 
available to them. This means that by the Bank's logic, farmers should be willing and 
able to take risk and make investments to improve their land. In the irrigation and 
drainage projects the Bank advocates, the government of Egypt is seen as unable to 
pay for these improvements on the large scale (World Bank, 1993; p. iv). On the small 
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scale however, farmers are expected to pitch in for improvements on their own land. 
Therefore, farmers are asked to handle some of the cost and risk involved. Treating 
farmers as capitalists is acceptable because as owners of the means of production, 
farmers are being asked to invest in their land and their surroundings in order to 
increase production. This becomes problematic because of the particular assumption 
involved in treating land as a means of production.  First of all, food is treated as a 
simple commodity whose price can be manipulated by altering the inputs. In other 
words, the assumption is that the rising price of inputs can be compensated for by 
both improved efficiency and a rise in the farmgate price. Yet while efficiency can be 
improved and costs lowered in that fashion, the farmgate price is not nearly as subject 
to change. Crops yields and prices depend on soil quality, weather, water quality, 
freedom from disease, manageable pest levels, and a number of other factors. Not all 
of these factors are so easily manipulated. Moreover, the farmgate price is largely 
dependent on factors outside direct farmer control. If there is a bumper crop in wheat 
for a major producer one year, then the market price will drop reflecting a surplus. 
This is not something an individual farmer has any control over. Food is not a typical 
commodity, and therefore an investment in land does not produce predictable returns. 
In places such as the United States and Europe, this uncertainty is mitigated by 
providing floor prices for crops and other forms of subsidies such as tax breaks or 
cash payouts. However, the Bank opposes these subsidies, referring to them as “price 
distortions”. Instead the Bank believes instead in the market as the ultimate regulator 
of price. This treatment of the market as the best regulator ultimately treats land as if 
it is a factory, ignoring agriculture's highly variable returns in favor of the economies 
of scale brought on by land consolidation. 
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 Another assumption made by treating land as a means of production in the 
sense of an industrial factory  is that it indicates a certain level of liquidity where cash 
is concerned. Farmers are seen as able to handle risks because they can increase crop 
production and make more money from increased outputs. However, it is often 
overlooked that farming is a cash-poor and inherently risky enterprise and 
smallholders are under-capitalized. Crops can and do fail due to lack of water, 
accident, or disease. A bad year can spell disaster and leave a farmer ill-equipped to 
deal with further risk. In addition, events half a world away can cause the farmgate 
price to drop unexpectedly, leading to lower than expected returns.  
 Moreover, money gained from crops is often gone as soon as it reaches the 
farmer's hands. This is because farmers are often extremely leveraged with respect to 
their land and crops in fashions that the Bank does not see. Farmers often go to local 
merchants, relatives, and other wealthy people to access credit (Hopkins, 1986; p. 76, 
90; Bush, 2002; p. 198). For those in possession of a hiaza card, there is also the 
option of the local agricultural cooperative. In the case of the merchants, collateral 
used is often the crop itself. Therefore, a portion of the crop is either immediately 
taken from farmers or the cash made off of it is immediately spent. In the case of 
cooperative membership, the cooperative charges farmers for the seeds and fertilizers, 
and if crops are sold back to the coop, then the cost of the inputs is deducted from the 
proceeds and the remaining money is given to the farmer. However, as the 
government no longer buys most crops, this is rarely an option. The remaining funds 
go toward household expenses such as food, clothing, and educational needs. If it is a 
good year, some of this money may be saved or carried over for the next crop. 
However, savings remain small, and given recent pressures and changes, savings are 
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even smaller than usual. At any given time, a farmer is highly unlikely to have a large 
amount of cash on hand. Hopkins (1988; p. 23) argues that smallholders are petty 
commodity producers utilizing a household as the means of production, not capitalists 
or bourgeoisie business owners. The Bank fails to adequately separate the bourgeoisie 
from those engaged in petty commodity production. Land might be a means of 
production, as the Bank views it, it is capable of generating capital only if one owns 
enough of it. A moment here is needed to point out the constraints that cause 
smallholders to be petty commodity producers. Small farmers are still constrained, but 
not in the same ways as they were in the 1980s when Hopkins was writing. State 
restrictions have been replaced by constraints placed on them by more powerful 
agricultural bourgeoisie interests as well as pressures from the agricultural 
liberalization pushed by the Bank. Where the state once dictated what crops could be 
grown, and what prices would be paid for these crops, now farmers are constrained by 
what a global market will accept as a fair price. Unlike the state, which usually 
provided a floor price, and in so doing a form of security, the prices of agricultural 
products on the global market are volatile and subject to a great deal of change from 
year to year, or even month to month. Smallholders are also constrained by the rising 
price of inputs, demands for investment in drainage and irrigation, and an increasing 
debt load. In the end the result is the same as Hopkins argued. Small farmers are 
making a wage, not generating capital. However, the treatment of farmers as 
producers of capital is part and parcel of creating a new geographic orientation being 
pushed by the Bank in which large landownership is predominant 
The Reason for Land as a Commodity and the Inherent Contradiction 
 The Bank emphasizes a different geographical and political orientation than 
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the current one in Egypt with regards to land ownership. Currently much of the land 
in the Egyptian countryside is owned by smallholders who possess 5 feddans of land 
or less. Yet in the article Rising Global Interest in Farmland: Can it Yield Sustainable 
and Equitable Benefits? (Deininger et al., 2011)  the World Bank specifically lays out 
a regulatory framework for the consolidation of land (Deininger et al., 2011; p. 32).  
 The Bank views having a few large landowners and a series of smallholders 
who service them as the end result of an efficient market system in countries such as 
Egypt and as a desirable outcome (Deininger et al., 2011; p. xxxv). Yet for land in 
Egypt to be configured with a few large landowners and a series of smallholders who 
service them, consolidation must occur. If land is to be treated as a means of 
production into which investments are made and large returns are sought, then large 
landowners are far better equipped to reap large returns than smallholders. Globally, 
the phenomenon of large-scale consolidation is called land-grabbing. Conceptually, in 
the case of Egypt, it is the consolidation of a number of smallholders engaged in petty 
commodity production into a few large plots engaged in capital-generating enterprise. 
The remaining petty commodity-producing smallholders are then supposed to service 
the needs of the few large agricultural enterprises, though the means of service 
mentioned by the Bank are unspecified and vague. The push here is for increased 
productivity, and as the Bank notes, this is because the use of farmland in developed 
countries is declining (Deininger et al., 2011; p. 16). Therefore the Bank sets out 
guidelines for land-grabbing, which they call “large-scale land acquisition”. These 
include respecting land and resource rights, ensuring food security, transparency, 
consultation and participation, responsible investing, and environmental sustainability 
(Deininger et al., 2011; p. xxvii). These guidelines are voluntary, however which 
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means that it is impossible to ensure a fair arrangement with regards to land.  
Moreover, the Bank is already ethically compromised here. The International 
Financial Corporation, the private investment section of the World Bank Group, has 
invested deeply in companies involved in large land acquisitions in Egypt (GRAIN, 
2011). The IFC has a stake in making sure these acquisitions happen because its 
returns depend on it. The Bank has not merely given loans to these corporations, but 
has bought into them as shareholders to the tune of over 347 million dollars (GRAIN, 
2011). It could be observed that the Bank is hardly a neutral observer or policymaker 
with the best interests of small farmers in mind. 
 Yet there is another problem with land consolidation. Land fragmentation in 
Egypt means that holdings tend to be scattered and large amounts of contiguous 
cropland are a rarity. Moreover, because inheritance divides up land within a family, 
adjacent holdings tend to be owned by the same family (Abdel-Khalek, 2002). 
Therefore a smallholder who is selling his land due to distress or some other reason 
may not be selling their land to the person next to them, but rather to someone whose 
land is somewhere down the road. Therefore land accumulation is a more likely 
outcome of these policies than land consolidation. However, another opportunity 
arises due to the current laws on rental. Land can still be rented, but it is done at much 
higher rates than were charged under the permanent tenancy contracts that existed 
prior to Law 96. Hence it is easier for large landowners to rent or lease land than it is 
for smallholders. Therefore it is possible for the Bank to achieve the new structure 
they desire not by land consolidation, but by accumulation. This accumulation can 
take the form of ownership or rental. Therefore a large factory farm can be built on 
leased or rented land as well as land owned. Though this is likely an unintended 
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consequence of Bank-backed policies,  it is an intentional act by the government of 
Egypt (Saad, 2002; p. 105). 
Technocratic Problems and Understandings of Land 
 It is important to discuss both the technocratic nature of the Bank's 
understanding of land as well its economic aspect. The World Bank's understanding of 
land is technocratic in that it views improvements to this land in technical terms. 
Improvements are brought about by the introduction of technologies such as tractors 
(World Bank, 2008; p. 4), deep plowing (World Bank, 2010; p. 41), and laser land 
leveling (World Bank, 2010; p. 41). Land is spoken of in terms of its productivity and 
the efficiency of its use. Emphasis is therefore given to the technological aspects of 
land as well as the economic returns that can be derived from technological 
improvements. However, the technocratic and technologic emphasis here is 
expensive, and not always the best option for small farmers. Deep plowing is used 
where soil below a few feet is hard or chalky. It utilizes a tractor carrying a large 
device used for tearing deep into the soil to loosen it. It is believed that deep 
ploughing increases crop yields by loosening otherwise difficult soils and allowing 
deeper root structures to grow. The Bank ignores more low-tech solutions such as no-
till or minimal tillage strategies, which do not require tractors or expensive machinery, 
even though they may be cheaper and ultimately more beneficial. Yet the technocratic 
emphasis of the Bank's knowledge precludes the use of methods like no-till. For the 
Bank, knowledge is technologic.  
The Land Center and Local Knowledges 
 The Land Center for Human Rights sees land in more expansive terms than 
that of the Bank.  These terms do not exclude land as a commodity or as a means of 
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production, but they are more expansive, and imply differing needs and desires than 
that of the World Bank. The Land Center also sees land as  heritage, a legacy, 
authenticity, and security.  
 Much of the land in Egypt, rented or otherwise, has been passed down through 
families for at least 40 years. When farmers speaking to the Land Center talk of their 
land, they always mention how long they have had it, who has been farming it, and 
what they have done to improve it (Land Center for Human Rights, 2003, p. 24; Land 
Center for Human Rights, 2001A; p. 16; Land Center for Human Rights, 2001B; p. 
19). These statements go further than defending a right to their land, though that is 
one aim. It is also a discourse of asala (تلاصا) or authenticity. They are stating that they 
are real farmers, sharing a family heritage that goes back generations. Authenticity is 
often contrasted with large landowners who live in Cairo, hire others to farm their 
land, and brag about it. 
 Ardi Hayati (يتايح يضرا) – My Land is My Life 
 Without reifying Ayrout's notion that farmers are tied to the land (Ayrout, 
2005; p. 6) or unduly romanticizing farming, a moment needs to be taken here to 
examine the wider cultural context in which the Land Center is situated and to discuss 
the perceived connection between land and small farmers in Egypt. Farmers plant 
crops in the field, tend them, and harvest them. They watch as plants sprout and the 
wheat waves in the field under the sunlight. They feed this food to their wives and 
children. They grow old and pass this land on to their children and their children pass 
it on to their children. Land can pass down within a single family through the 
generations. There is a satisfaction in this process of generational investment in labor 
and hard work that cannot easily be quantified. Within the discourse of authenticity, 
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this process of generational labor and heritage is what makes smallholders the “real” 
farmers in Egypt. It is a portion of their identity and gives legitimacy to small farmers 
as the rightful owners of that land. Ownership here is not doled out on paper, as 
indeed many small farmers do not have such papers anyway (Bush, 2002; p. 20).  
Instead, ownership is a matter of length of time, work done, and family and 
generational labor.  
 “The dream of Farraag now is to own a piece of arable land and work in 
planting it as this is the only thing he knows in life and the only thing that will 
provide him a secure income.” - Land Center for Human Rights, 2003; p. 1 
 As the Land Center acknowledges,the stated goal of many farmers is to buy 
more land, or to own land of their own (Land Center for Human Rights, 2001A; p. 2; 
Land Center for Human Rights, 2003; p. 1). Buying land is a difficult process and 
land can be extremely expensive. Yet small farmers dream of owning land. This is 
because of the economic security and prestige that owning land brings. When the 
Land Center documents a farmer, they often mention how much land they own and 
for how many years they have owned it (Land Center for Human Rights, 2003, p. 2). 
However, the purpose of mentioning land ownership goes beyond mere 
documentation. In Egyptian society, land ownership is associated with respectability. 
Within the countryside, being, as the Land Center puts it, a “simple farmer” (Land 
Center for Human Rights, 2003; p. 1), brings with it a certain level of respectability 
and authenticity. It can also be argued that someone claiming to be a “simple farmer” 
is also claiming to be part of the ibn al-balad (دلابلا نبا), or sons of the country. As 
Armbrust argues, the ibn al-balad are seen as rough, but good people and to be a part 
of this group is no shame (Armbrust, 2001; p. 205). The extra food more land can 
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provide means that  families are healthier and the extra money from more crop sales 
can allow children to get a better education, but it also solidifies one as an authentic 
member of the ibn al-balad and as such authentic and good.  
 Given the aforementioned arguments, losing land is more than watching crops 
in the field go to someone else. When small farmers lose land, they lose heritage, a 
legacy, and a portion of their authenticity. The damage goes far beyond a loss of 
security, and this is something that is difficult to quantify. 
 In addition, the de-skilling of the labor force (Hopkins, 1988; p. 25) and its 
relation to land and authenticity is also worth discussing here. One of the Bank's main 
initiatives is to educate farmers as to the reputed benefits of modern agricultural 
technologies such as tractors, reapers, and more advanced irrigation (World Bank, 
2010; p. 41) in order to increase returns. Yet in contradiction to the Bank's contention 
that knowledge is free and available to all (World Bank Knowledge Report, 2010; p. 
16), here we see that it is not. The returns from smallholding are sufficient neither to 
afford to buy advanced agricultural technologies, nor the education required to obtain 
the knowledge to maintain these technologies. Therefore smallholders rent out this 
knowledge and technology from wealthier farmers and organizations (Hopkins, 1987; 
p. 107).  
 Aside from the additional leveraging and pressure required to rent these items, 
there is another problem here. First of all, de-skilling is not necessarily an accurate 
term here. Mechanization is only truly useful when there is a deficiency in the labor 
available to cultivate land. Most smallholders in Egypt do not own more land than 
they are capable of cultivating with either household or hired labor. What 
mechanization does is allow for large-scale farms with a minimum of labor costs. 
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Labor-intensive techniques of agriculture are still utilized where capital is insufficient 
for rental, where mechanization may not be appropriate, and where mechanization is 
not necessary. A tractor is not needed to till a portion of land smaller than a feddan, 
nor it is likely to be affordable to a farmer owning or renting such a plot. Yet the 
World Bank privileges mechanization over manual labor and thus local methods and 
knowledge of land cultivation are devalued. However, despite Bank contentions about 
a lack of technological knowledge, smallholders have been using tractors for over 70 
years (Hopkins, 1987; p. 105). Tractors are being rented by smallholders who cannot 
afford them otherwise. Whether or not technology rental ultimately beneficial to 
smallholders is up for debate: however, smallholders are learning about these 
technologies and how to use them. While many farmers are using mechanized 
methods to work their land, some are not. The reasons are complex and cannot 
entirely be attributed to the cost of rental or ownership of a tractor. Some plots of land 
are too small or too narrow to be properly tilled by a tractor and other farmers use 
animal-based methods of water-lifting because they are more convenient to the task at 
hand. In some cases, a discourse of “keeping the old methods alive” may also be 
defense. Also, as Mitchell points out, older methods may also be used as a shield 
against the dangers of the market (Mitchell, 2002; p. 247). These farmers may be 
embarrassed that they are unable to afford a tractor, and so take pride in the fact that 
they cultivate their crops by hand in order to defend themselves against charges of 
poverty or inadequacy. Yet regardless of the reasons, these methods do remain, and 
the Bank does not recognize that they are there, creating an unseen conflict between 
authenticity, convenience, and Bank ideas of modernity. 
 The Bank recognizes that small farmers are unable to take on the full costs of 
 42 
technological investments in land, and it is willing to help by means of subsidy or 
loan. Aside from the fact that taking a loan is a risk unto itself, the particular problem 
here does not come from the risk of credit alone. Following the neo-liberal model, the 
Bank has argued that subsidies to inputs should be removed (World Bank, 1993; p. 8). 
Input subsidies include those covering fertilizers, pesticides, and herbicides. 
Furthermore, arguing that land is a means of production, the Bank supports taxing 
farmers owning less than three feddans of land (World Bank, 1993; p. 32-33), 
something that the government of Egypt already does (Land Center for Human 
Rights, 2003; p. 28). This taxation is something that the Land Center opposes on 
grounds that it adds expenses to those who are already poor (Land Center for Human 
Rights, 2003; p. 28).It is seemingly ignored here that entrepreneurship in most 
countries is “subsidized” by tax breaks. This is not to say that such measures are 
appropriate for all countries. It is rather to point out that the Bank is ignoring common 
and worthwhile practices in other countries by re-conceptualizing land as a means of 
production and inappropriately elevating small farmers to the ranks of the 
bourgeoisie.   However, the largest part of the problem comes with the aggregate risks 
involved. While additional expenditures on improved irrigation and maintenance may 
seem small to the Bank (World Bank, 1993; p. iv), it is debatable whether or not this 
is a small cost to farmers. Moreover, the aggregate risk involved in exposing farmgate 
prices directly to the world marketplace, paying more for inputs, and investing in land 
creates a process of attrition that can eventually lead to the loss of land by 
smallholders. 
 In addition to viewing land as a means of production, the Bank also views land 
as a commodity. As such, land should be bought and sold freely. As briefly mentioned 
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in the previous chapter, the Bank along with USAID has pushed for land registration 
in Egypt (Bush, 2002; p. 22). This desire for land registration bears further 
examination here. This push for registration does two things. First of all, land 
registration paves the way for consolidation in land, which the Bank acknowledges as 
one of its goals. Second, registration provides legibility for the government. By 
forcing land registration, land can be both taxed and sold in a much simpler fashion 
than is currently provided for. Moreover, treating land as a commodity means that 
arrangements such as tenancy, which was common prior to Law 96, are problematic. 
As mentioned before, tenanted land was difficult to sell and stood in the way of land 
consolidation by means of either sale or large-scale rental. Therefore, the Bank 
backed the changes in the tenancy law and pushed for land titling. Yet the harmful and 
negative effects of these changes went largely unnoticed by the Bank.  
 These effects relate to the second major consequence of treating land as a 
simple commodity: people disappear from it. Commoditizing land alienates people 
from it in both the physical and discursive sense. Land is an object to be bought and 
sold, but it has no value beyond that. A land market is achieved at the cost of land 
value. If people are not seen as part of the landscape, then they are easily removed 
from it. The Bank utilizes a euphemism to deal with impoverishment: “economic 
dislocation.” This term refers to those who are displaced by structural adjustment and 
more specifically, indicates migration, whether this is rural-urban or otherwise. The 
Bank views these dislocations as an inevitable part of adjustment (World Bank, 1993; 
p. 12). In fact, to deal with economic dislocation, urban migration is encouraged in the 
hopes that new migrants will find jobs in the city. The violence involved is ignored. 
However, dislocation does not always end in urban migration or some form of 
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proletarianization. Former tenants find work as agricultural day laborers, or they 
move into the cities and often the slums. The commoditization of land has made a 
severe decrease in quality of life possible. 
 However, land cannot be so narrowly viewed as only a commodity. People live 
on it and are deeply invested in it. Nor is land a means of production in the factory 
sense. Land does produce food, but it does not conform to most of the basic rules by 
which factories are governed. Though labor can influence crop price, the price of a 
crop is not the aggregate of the labor spent on it. While more labor intensive crops 
such as saffron or vanilla are more expensive on the whole, the price can also be 
attributed to their scarcity. Not many regions are suitable for their growth. Arguably, 
this restriction does not apply to more commonly grown crops such as cotton, wheat, 
or maize. Crop price is rather a function of how every other identical crop has done 
that year the world over. To farm is to bet against weather, disease, and natural 
disaster.  If one year in the United States, the weather is good, and wheat produces a 
bumper crop, then the global price will drop, removing many of the possible financial 
gains that improved production in Egypt has made. Moreover, if a natural disaster or a 
period of disease occurs in Egypt, the crop may be insufficient to provide income 
needed to pay for investment. Hence cropping is not nearly as reliable an indicator of 
cash returns as is manufacturing t-shirts or batteries. Moreover, land is more than a 
commodity. While land is bought and sold, it is not unoccupied. Allowing land to be 
narrowly commoditized erases people physically and discursively from it, and ignores 
the fact that its value goes beyond monetary wealth. 
 The Space in Between: Devalued Definitions 
 Though the Land Center would not disagree with the World Bank that land is a 
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means of production, there are key differences in their views of land that are worth 
examining. The Bank tends to view land in economic terms, while the Land Center 
possesses a  more expansive view of land that includes personal terms. 
 Authenticity, or asala (تلصا) is more than a discourse of belonging. 
Authenticity is a discourse of defense. Within Egyptian society, authenticity is valued 
even as it is denigrated. Farmers may be seen as pre-modern fellahin, but they are also 
viewed as the storehouse of authentic cultural knowledge (Armbrust, 1996; p. 38). 
This is why when the Land Center documents a piece of farmer's land, they never fail 
to cite the farmer's family, the length of time on the land, and the improvements made 
to the land (Land Center for Human Rights, 2003; p. 20; Land Center for Human 
Rights, 2001B; p. 32). The discourse of authenticity with regard to land ownership is 
utilized to emphasize the rights of small farmers and their value in Egyptian society. 
The discourse of authenticity regarding land ownership therefore serves as a defense 
against the encroaching and often damaging knowledge systems utilized by the Bank. 
Unfortunately, the two parties are talking past each other here. The Bank 
systematically devalues local systems of knowledge. Knowledge about land and 
agriculture is meant to flow from the center to the periphery (World Bank, 1998; p. 
13), not the other way around. Therefore, though individuals may learn the Bank's 
definitions of land, there is no place for the Bank to learn about the way farmers view 
land. Local knowledge of land is obtained and utilized by the Bank only insofar as it 
can be used to get farmers to utilize Bank knowledge. Despite protestations about 
knowledge going two ways (World Bank, 1998; p. 13), the Bank emphasizes  
economics and a form of social facts in order to understand what other cultures need 
from it. The Bank thus collects economic knowledge of land, but not local 
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understandings of land such as authenticity. Furthermore, this collection of knowledge 
is seen as only useful in convincing small farmers to use Bank knowledge.    
 Moreover, social facts such as those the Bank collected about the Bedouin in 
Marsah Matrouh (World Bank, 2004A; p. 125-161) allow for several problems to 
arise. In Marsa Matrouh in particular, the Bank only goes so far as to elucidate their 
perception of Bedouin social structure and culture. Possible transformations in the 
structure as well as exceptions are not allowed for here, and hence the Bank is unable 
to grasp the deeper implications or reasons for this structure. If social facts are 
believed not to change, then it is a simple logical step to argue that these social facts 
have not changed in centuries. In the case of the Bedouin, the Bank repeatedly refers 
to them as “traditional”. This denial of co-temporality is especially easy when the 
Bank speaks of traditional societies and cultures in terms of social stability (World 
Bank, 1998; p. 72). It is even more of a problem in Egypt where an essentialist 
peasant discourse is prevalent among the elites of Cairo and Alexandria (Armbrust, 
2001; p. 38). Hence the concept of a “knowledge gap” can be sustained as not only 
are Egyptian farmers lacking Bank technical skills, but their very co-temporality with 
the Bank is denied. In stating that poorer nations “need not re-invent the wheel” 
(World Bank, 1998; p. 2) the Bank's invocation of the primitive seems oddly 
representative of the problem here. In multiple places, the Bank documents refer 
vaguely to of the value of indigenous knowledge, yet the only concrete examples 
given are of indigenous peoples knowledge of plants that could be used for western 
medicine and of the role played by women in developing new crop varieties by testing 
them on behalf of several corporations (World Bank, 1998; p. 153). Who benefits 
more from “local knowledge” here is seriously in question as is the reification of 
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poorer nations as populated with primitives incapable of helping themselves. Since 
the Bank takes knowledge to be a “public good” (World Bank, 1998; p. 131) the 
power differential between the Bank and small farmers is ignored. Yet there is force 
involved here. The Bank's powerful sources of finance mean that the Egyptian 
government has a powerful incentive to accept Bank meanings, reinterpreting and 
using them to enrich the ruling classes. 
 The reason that this transformation is possible is because Bank understandings 
of land, being largely economic, are shallower than those of organizations such as the 
Land Center or even the Egyptian government. Meanings associated with land such as 
authenticity are absent from Bank discourse, but they are not absent from the 
discourse in the countryside or the Egyptian government. In the case of Law 96, the 
Bank understandings of land as a commodity and a means of production were used 
only shallowly. The government of Egypt was more accurately dealing with 
discourses of authenticity similar to those found in Land Center documents. Public 
discourse labelled tenants lazy and greedy (Saad, 2002; p. 109), implying that they 
were not authentic or hardworking, and thus large landowners were more worthy of 
state protection and help. This government and large landowner discourse was 
propagated in contradiction to the discourses of small farmers and the Land Center. In 
the end, the Bank's meaning did not so much prevail as it was transformed. The 
government of Egypt decided that smallholders were parasitic and therefore further 
commoditized land to the advantage of large landowners. 
 In some cases, seeking its own interests, the Government of Egypt even 
colludes with the Bank in these meanings. An example of this collusion is of Law 96 
of 1992, which was supported by the World Bank(World Bank, 1993; p. 32), and 
 48 
USAID (Bush, 2002; p. 20) in order to take advantage of economies of scale brought 
on by possible land consolidation. The government of Egypt's purpose in passing the 
Law was to allow landowners to charge higher rental rates (Saad, 2002; p. 115), while 
I argue that the Bank's purpose in supporting the law was to further commoditize land. 
Farmers were left ill-informed of Law 96's passing or its consequences (Saad, 2002; 
p. 115-116), which removed the inheritability of tenancy and de-regulated rental 
prices. The result of this reform was a violent series of dispossessions (Land Center 
for Human Rights, 2002; p. 128). There were been widespread reports of violence, 
extortion, and dispossession in the countryside at the time and leading up to the 
present day. Such violence between large landowners and smallholders has occurred 
at least since the 1950s and the initial land reforms by Abdel-Nasser (Mitchell, 2002; 
p. 153-172). Despite the fact that scholarly journals, press articles, and the Land 
Center covered the violence after Law 96 extensively, there is not one single mention 
of these actions in the Bank reports written during these times. The Bank reports are 
disturbingly and unaccountably silent. There is even evidence that the authors of the 
reports have read some of these documents. In his scholarly notes and articles, rural 
sociologist Ray Bush has described the violence associated with Law 96 extensively, 
and at least one Bank document cites Bush (World Bank, 2010; p. 102). Yet there is 
no mention of the violence or torture detailed in any of Bush's articles. This is highly 
suggestive of a serious and terrifying suppression of information by the Bank itself. 
As a self-proclaimed “arbiter” of neutral knowledge, such an elision or omission is 
particularly disturbing. The violence in the countryside cannot have gone unnoticed 
by Bank analysts. Yet the understandings gained from these moments have somehow 
been suppressed. The more disturbing conclusion that can be drawn here is that a full 
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acknowledgement of the effects of Bank policies in Egypt might be damaging to Bank 
operations in Egypt or even to the willingness of wealthier democratic nations to 
provide funding for further Bank projects. In order to preserve the Bank's system of 
knowledge with regards to land and its financial and policy interests, it can be 
surmised this information was suppressed. 
 Land fragmentation is another issue where local knowledge  and 
understandings of land and effects outcomes in unforeseen ways. Part of the reason 
that the Bank has pushed for tenancy reforms and land registration is the stated 
objective to create a land market (Bush, 2002; p. 20). The land market was meant to 
allow a reduction in fragmentation and thereby increase production. However, 
fragmentation in Egypt is in part a result of the application of Islamic inheritance 
laws. Here we can see that tenancy actually served as a shield against land 
fragmentation because rented land was not owned and therefore shielded from 
inheritance laws. The inherited nature of tenancy and the inability to sell land  meant 
that land could not be fragmented when its owner died either. Removing tenancy 
restrictions may actually result in even more fragmentation of land over a period of 
generations. Moreover, fragmentation is dealt with by a complex series of 
negotiations and relationships (Abdel-Aal, 2002; p. 140) meant to insure that each 
household has land to grow crops on. Not only do smallholders own land, but they 
also rent in and rent out land inside and outside their families (Abdel-Aal, 2002; p. 
143). The Bank's largely economic and technocratic perspective on land means that it 
views land fragmentation as an obstacle that inhibits production, but its uninformed 
perspectives have lead it to miss the relationships that produced land fragmentation 
and allowed rental to begin with. Thus, in dealing with any given project, the Bank 
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must negotiate with numerous stakeholders and navigate a complex series of 
relationships. On smaller-scale projects such as irrigation schemes in the Nile delta, 
the Bank deals only with households and larger political structures (World Bank, 
2010; p. 7). Hence, the family and outside relationships that surround land 
fragmentation are ignored because the Bank focuses on large political structures and 
households and not the web of relationships between them. In the case of large-scale 
policy, the invisibility of these relationships to the World Bank means that radical 
changes have altered on these sets of relationships, such as in the loss of tenure. One 
result of these changes has increasing pressure on small farmers which has resulted in 
discord and violence (Land Center for Human Rights, 2002; p. 131). Such violence 
has not just come between small farmers (Land Center for Human Rights, 2002; p. 
137), but also between large landowners and small farmers (Land Center for Human 
Rights, 2002; p. 131; Land Center for Human Rights, 200A1. p. 17-20). Nineteen 
years after Law 96 was passed, sporadic violence is still ongoing and the ramifications 
of the loss of tenure on these relationships have still not been fully understood. 
 Moreover, while the Bank may argue that the weak property rights as 
evidenced in Egypt by a complex system of local land registration are the reason for 
rural conflict, the Bank's alternative is also inherently problematic. In the Bank's eyes, 
a free market with firm property rights (i.e., registered land) will reduce conflict by 
allowing free and informed consent on sales of land or land lease (World Bank, 2010; 
p. xxxii). However, again relationships are overlooked. Due to the complicated rental 
market that still exists, conflict is still a problem. Also, even though physical coercion 
by beatings may be less prevalent in a regime with firm land rights, although it is 
debatable whether or not this is the case, economic coercion is still present. Bank 
 51 
policies that resulted in the government of Egypt eliminating input subsidies and 
ending government purchase of crops at floor prices have put strains on the finances 
of small farmers. Some who once rented land have been forced to give it up, while 
some smallholders have been forced to sell their land. While this form of coercion 
may be legal, it is still coercion. Given that some of these smallholders no doubt 
rented portions of their land, conflict still occurs. For example when Law 96 went 
fully into effect, there were still some tenants renting land. Even though they had legal 
leases, they were forced off extrajudicially. The Land Center has documented a 
process whereby police would pick up tenants or their families, threaten them with 
arrest, beat them, and force them to sign away their land (Land Center for Human 
Rights, 2002; p. 131). Even owners have also been picked up by the police and forced 
off reform land in the same way (Land Center for Human Rights, 2001B; p. 16-20). 
After such extrajudicial events, the resulting document that turns over land rights to a 
new owner is then accepted as legally binding. The transfer of land by extortion or 
imprisonment may not be legal in the sense of rule of law, but it results from 
corruption, not weak land rights as the Bank alleges. 
Conclusion: Land as Commodity and Means of Production 
 The World Bank sees land as a commodity to be traded and a means of 
production. This view of land as both means of production and commodity ties into 
the ultimate goal of the Bank: the transformation of smallholdings into the Bank's 
vision of a factory farm. This conceptual farm is fully mechanized, with tilling, 
sowing, reaping, and pesticide and herbicide applications all done by machine. 
Advanced knowledges of soil science and horticultural techniques are utilized to 
produce maximum returns from the soil. Modern irrigation minimizes water use, 
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while new cultivars of wheat, corn, and other crops produce ever-higher returns. In 
this vision, numerous smallholdings become a few much larger sets of land that are 
capable of producing capital and utilizing the Bank's technologies. Moreover, the fact 
that large landowners are adopting Bank-advocated practices means that they are 
taking on the Bank's worldview as well, and they have good reason to do so. If land is 
a commodity, then large landowners have more money to buy or rent  than anyone 
else. If land is a means of production, then by buying or renting it as a commodity, 
large landowners can increase production and generate more capital. As for the 
remaining smallholders, many of them are already engaged in supporting larger 
farms. Smallholders provide day labor to large landowners, rent tractors from them, 
and service debts to them. All of these actions provide further profit to large 
landowners and indicate that at least a part of the Bank's vision is being realized. 
Moreover, understandings of land as a source of authenticity, a legacy, and a source of 
security have been either devalued or shifted to favor large landowners, though this 
was not an act of direct intent by the World Bank. They are instead a consequence of 
understandings of land not seen by the Bank. 
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Chapter 3: Moral Economy, Risk Aversion, and the Process of Social Change 
Introduction 
 In this chapter I discuss the World Bank's view of moral economy as risk 
aversion. I critique the Bank's view of moral economy based on anthropological and 
sociological data available. I follow that critique with a discussion of the Land 
Center's view of moral economy as a series of social obligations and as a system of 
support in which the state plays an integral part. I will finish with a discussion of what 
happens when these two discourses meet, and the end result of this collision.  
 It is also worth noting here that moral economy is a theoretical idea based on a 
set of behaviors exhibited in poorer communities such as the countryside in Egypt. As 
such, it is absent from Bank and Land Center discourse.However, I will show that the 
aspects they each deal with imply a particular and limited understanding of moral 
economy and that this understanding has an effect on their policies, whether they 
realize it or not. As such, at key points I supplement the Bank and the Land Center's 
understandings of moral economy with evidence from sociological and 
anthropological literature in order to provide a wider picture of the effects of Bank-
backed policies and projects in Egypt on moral economy. 
Moral Economy as Risk Aversion: The World Bank 
 The World Bank mostly deals with moral economy in the context of risk 
aversion due to limited income. They state that “a limited financing capacity is 
responsible for the significant risk aversion of small farmers and the resulting cautious 
adoption of agricultural technologies” (World Bank, 2003; p. 63).   Rather than 
dealing with moral economy in the context of risk management, one of its aspects, the 
Bank sees the operation of a moral economy as recalcitrance, and the avoidance of 
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risk due to the limited capacity to finance projects.  
 Therefore, it is worthwhile to take a moment and discuss what kinds of risks 
that the Bank wishes farmers to take or that Bank-backed policies require farmers to 
take. It is important to realize that small farmers are not merely being asked to take 
risks themselves, but are being subjected to increasingly risky conditions. Items such 
as the removal of input subsidies are not risks that farmers are forced to take, but 
rather risky conditions that farmers are subjected to. These also require means of 
mitigation which can take the form of increased loans. They are thus an indirect risk. 
Conceptually, most investment risks the Bank advocates are long-term risks with 
substantial calculated benefits if they pay off. Most farming crop cycles mean that 
investments in new crops such as fruit trees or cut flowers require several years to pay 
off or that payoffs may accrue over time. Improved drainage such as that advocated in 
the ongoing drainage projects may take several years or at least several irrigation 
cycles before damaged soils are drained of poisons. It is important to realize that the 
only things conceptualized by the Bank as risks are those that can produce a profit in 
the end. Increased input prices are not conceptualized as a risk because they are not an 
investment in improvement that can pay off. Instead they constitute a stimulus that is 
used to increase efficiency and provide market-related impetus. Farmer's reluctance to 
adopt new crops, make new investments in irrigation, and to borrow are therefore 
conceptualized as risk aversion. However, the Bank is merely substituting one means 
of managing risk for another here. Moral economy spreads out risk for any given task, 
while Bank projects expect one individual or family to bear the risk of the task on 
their own.  
First of all, not conceptualizing unsubsidized inputs as a risk is flawed. Most 
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commercial nitrogen-fixing fertilizers now in use are based on natural gas (Foth, 
1990; p. 221). Therefore these fertilizer prices are subject to fluctuations in the 
petroleum market. This connection to the petroleum markets contributed to the food 
crisis in 2009 when the increasing price of oil forced the price of fertilizer to go up 
(FAO, 2009; p. 1). Since the price of fertilizer is tied to petroleum, a volatile market, 
then fertilizer prices are also volatile. By asking farmers to assume the full cost of 
fertilizer, the Bank expects farmers to risk the volatility of the petroleum market on 
purchase. Moreover, the financial calculations that farmers made prior to this change 
assumed the cost of fertilizer to be stable, or at least remain within a reasonable range. 
When it ceased to be subsidized, farmers had to spend increasing amounts of money 
to fertilize their crops. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that fertilizer purchase 
provides an indirect risk in the form of the need for increased credit, and that fertilizer 
purchase at market pricing is both a direct and an indirect risk. 
 Moreover, moral economy is a means of managing risk through social 
redistribution of wealth and spreading risk among family members and neighbors 
(Scott, 1976; p. ). It is also characterized by deeply imbedded social and religious 
obligations. That the bank sees moral economy narrowly as risk aversion creates a 
problem, because risk aversion is something to overcome, while risk management is 
something that must be understood. It is therefore paradoxical for an organization 
such as the Bank, largely made up of career economists and lawyers, should fail to 
understand this concept. Moreover, the Bank believes that “to take this risk aversion 
into account and hence increase the possibilities for adoption by small farmers, the 
crop and livestock models of the "with project" alternative will require only very 
limited investment and additional operational cost in cash.” (World Bank, 2003; p. 
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63). This is also a problem, because actions the Bank sees as risk aversion in this case 
are more likely related to social insurance. The moral economy in the countryside 
provides multiple means of social insurance and protection, and replacing them is not 
an inexpensive or simple matter. Community obligation spread over many sources 
requires the substitution of a much larger sum of money than what the Bank allows 
here. Moreover, credit from a bank is a riskier alternative than a loan or gift from a 
family member or neighbor. Credit does not mitigate risk, but rather increases it. 
Community funds such as the Bank occasionally suggests are a good idea, but 
equitable distribution and management of these funds is an extremely complex 
process, and aside from occasionally suggesting it (World Bank, 2011; p. 119), it is an 
idea that the Bank has shown little interest in implementing itself. A moral economy 
and its means of risk management are much more complex than the Bank would 
allow. 
 Moral economy operates differently on different levels, and it is therefore 
useful to discuss Bank policy and its effects on the various social strata in the 
countryside individually. Small farmers have the most need of the insurance moral 
economy provides, and suffer the most if it fails. For small farmers, moral economy is 
not merely risk aversion, but social insurance (Scott, 1976). In a bad year, they may 
call upon mid-range farmers, or those owning 5-15 feddan, and large landowners, 
who own more than 15 feddan in order to provide more support. Moreover, prior to 
structural adjustment, the state provided protection in the form of input subsidies, 
government jobs, and permanent land tenure. These protections, in combination with 
social obligations placed on mid-range farmers, provided a measure of stability. 
However, the loss of these protections has placed social pressure on mid-range and 
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large landowners that they are either ill-equipped or simply not desirous of accepting.  
 Mid-range farmers have incentive to participate in the moral economy because 
they bear the most risk of slipping down into the ranks of smallholders themselves. 
They support smallholders because they are only one step above them in the financial 
ladder and this means that they may need smallholders later on in order to prevent 
themselves from sliding back down. Moreover, Islamic inheritance laws mean that 
many mid-range farmers will very likely be returned to the ranks of smallholders 
within a generation. Eventually, when the owner passes, the land will be divided up 
among his or her children, creating more smallholders. Given that mid-range farmers 
are already on the brink of returning to the rank of smallholders, they are already ill-
equipped to deal with increased demands. Moreover, they are also affected by the 
same government cutbacks that smallholders are dealing with. The loss of input 
subsidies and the lack of permanent tenure put additional financial pressure on mid-
range farmers. Rental is now likely out of their range, because they cannot afford the 
market rates, and they can no longer rely on the government to provide jobs for their 
children upon graduation. Their opportunities are decreasing just as they are 
experiencing increased social demands from an ailing smallholder class.  
 Large landowners have the least incentive to participate in a moral economy 
because the large size of their landholdings often secures them against financial 
misfortune and land fragmentation by means of inheritance. They have more land, 
therefore when it is divided up, it is less likely that the resulting individual holdings 
will fall below 5 feddan. In addition, large landowning enterprises may be insulated 
from land fragmentation by legal means such as incorporation. Yet even while large 
landowners have the least incentive to participate, because they are already secure, 
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they receive the most pressure and have the most obligations to the moral economy. 
The end result is a moral economy in transition. Smallholders and mid-range 
landowners can no longer support each other as well as they once did, and must rely 
increasingly on large landowners, who have the least incentive of all to participate in 
the moral economy. 
 At one point, the state took on many of the obligations of moral economy, by 
providing government jobs, input subsidies, and the legal protection of permanent 
land tenure. Yet the state, in collusion with large landowners and with the support of 
the World Bank has withdrawn from this arena and no longer provides the services it 
once did. NGOs and Islamic organizations can serve to bridge a part of this gap, but 
given the enormity of the task, it is unlikely that they can solve the problem. There are 
too many people in need of services and there is not enough money being spent in the 
right places. 
The Moral Economy and the State 
 Before going further, it is worth discussing for a moment the state's role in the 
moral economy so that we can discuss the Bank's view of the state in the context of 
moral economy as well as the Land Center's view. 
 The state has not been traditionally considered as a part of the moral economy. 
However, in Egypt, it can be the case. A key part of the moral economy in Egypt has 
always been the social redistribution of wealth and the provision of social insurance. 
This social insurance has been provided by either the state, large landowners, or 
smallholders. Yet it is the state that concerns us here. Prior to 1952 and Abdel-Nasser, 
the moral economy in the countryside was in large part extant within the 'Izbah 
system. Large landowners were thus responsible for the social redistribution of wealth 
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by various means (Richards, 1980; p. 5) . The large landowning classes, conceptually 
at least, provided protection from the state. In turn, they exploited the workers under 
their protection. After the 1952 revolution, Mohammed Naguib and then Abdel-
Nasser went about establishing a “welfare state”, more accurately termed as state-run 
capitalism (Mitchell, 2002; p. 280). The state provided protection in several forms. 
First of all, under Nasser's agrarian reform, many of the large landholdings of the old 
pasha class were broken up and redistributed, creating a class of smallholders (Bush, 
2002; p.9). In addition, the state established new tenure laws (Bush, 2002; p. 9), input 
subsidies, and provided government jobs to graduates. In making the new tenant and 
smallholder classes dependent on the state, Nasser increased his own power at the 
expense of the pasha class (Bush, 2002; p. 9) as well as took functions of the moral 
economy into the state. Thus the state took a new role in the moral economy, serving 
as a protector, conceptually at least, of small farmers from large landowners. In the 
1990s, with the advent of Law 96 of 1992, the state began stripping away portions of 
the social safety net and abandoned much of its role in the moral economy. Law 96 
transformed tenure and removed the state's role as a protector in that arena. Moreover, 
the state ended input subsidies (World Bank, 1993; p. iii) and the employment 
guarantee for graduates. Only the bread subsidy remains. However, the people 
continue to look to the state as a protector. Right up until Law 96 went into full effect 
in 1997, people still believed that President Mubarak would intervene and stop the 
law (Saad, 2002; p. 115). The state, embodied in the president, was seen as a protector 
from the  landowning class and parliament who passed the law. In the end, what the 
state did was not as important as what it failed to do: it did not protect small farmers 
and it did not fulfill its role in the moral economy. 
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The World Bank and the State: Moral Economy and the “Welfare State” 
 The World Bank does not recognize the state's role in the moral economy, or 
its role in mitigating risk. Instead, the Bank, at least in the beginning, saw the state as 
a “welfare state” (Egypt Human Development Report, 2005; p. 4) in the sense that 
they provided too much support to the population, damaging market potential (World 
Bank, 1994; p. 94). Hence the state role in mitigating risk and serving as a protector is 
not taken into account. The Bank sees the state as a facilitator of free commerce, and 
not as a provider of social protection. Therefore the Bank advocates shifting the 
function of social protection to the private sector, where efficiency can be achieved, 
thus reducing state debt and expense.  
Land Center for Human Rights: The State as Patron and Protector 
 “The LCHR demands from the Minister of Agriculture to interfere to protect 
 the rights of these villagers saving them from banishment.” (Land Center for 
 Human Rights, 2001; p. 2) 
 The Land Center for Human Rights sees the state as the rightful protector of 
the people and as their patron. When speaking of Law 96 of 1992, official corruption,  
and ongoing violence against small farmers, the Land Center calls on the state to 
protect small farmers from the large landowning classes (Land Center for Human 
Rights, 2001B; p. 3). They ignore the fact that the state passed laws such as Law 96 in 
the first place because they see the state as the protector of the people of Egypt. In 
their eyes, the failure did not lay in the state's rapacious desires, but those of the large 
landowning class from which the state failed to protect small farmers. Hence, the state 
failed in its role in the moral economy. Moreover, when dealing with education, the 
Land Center calls on the state to provide the means for small farmers to educate their 
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children (Land Center for Human Rights, 2001C; p. 1) and decry its failure to make 
certain that everyone has a chance to go to school. When dealing with the Agricultural 
Bank, and its alleged corruption, they also call on the state and not the courts or large 
landowners to protect them (Land Center for Human Rights, 2003; p. 27). The Land 
Center views the state as the protector within the moral economy of the countryside.  
Moral Economy and Risk Management: The Land Center 
 Moral economy is a means not of avoiding risk, but rather of risk 
management. In this case, risk is managed both by the community and by individuals 
in a particular fashion. Risk is spread over multiple members of a community. Moral 
economy also constitutes a set of preconceptions derived from living close to the 
margins for a long period of time (Scott, 1976; p. 2). Under a moral economy, risk is 
calculated not with anticipation of a possible profit, but with consideration of possible 
loss. Avoiding a loss is seen as preferable to making gains because loss can mean 
starvation (Scott, 1976; p. 4). In this context, risks will be taken only if one is certain 
that they can be borne safely. Moreover, it means that logically speaking, if someone 
engaged in a moral economy is given a choice, they will take a steady meal over a 
risky venture with a high reward because the consequences of risky ventures are 
simply too high (Scott, 1976; p. 4). Specifically, the likelihood of innovation or 
capital risk taking is determined to the closeness of a particular person to biological 
subsistence (Scott, 1976; p. 19). In Egypt, there is a strong material correlation 
between land, education, and the propensity to take risk. This means that in Egypt, the 
likelihood that a farmer will take a particular investment or accept a given risk is 
dependent on whether or not they possess sufficient wealth in the form of land or 
education to cushion the risk. The Bank interprets this phenomenon as indicating that 
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the wealthier and more educated are naturally more innovative (World Bank and 
OECD, 2008; p. 30). However, risk-taking is more accurately seen as a factor of class, 
with wealth and education serving as buffers to risk. Because a small farmer is likely 
to be closer to biological subsistence than a large landowner or an educated person, 
they are less likely to take on additional risk, because everyday life is already risky 
enough. It is not that small farmers fail to innovate, but rather that the risk of 
innovation and investment for them is simply higher than it is for larger landowners. 
The Means of Moral Economy in Egypt: Risk Management 
 The Land Center does not present a clearly articulated theory of moral 
economy. However, it does propose aspects of a moral economy. Specifically, the 
Land Center indirectly alludes to moral economy in the context of outlines of 
structures of education, cropping, and social justice and reciprocity.  
 In the case of education, the Land Center argues that the recent policies, 
including Law 96, have prevented many children from acquiring an education (Land 
Center for Human Rights, 2001C; p. 4-5). This inability to obtain an education 
damages the moral economy within households, because within the countryside, 
agriculture is a profession of last resort. The purpose of education is to get someone 
out of agriculture and to support those who remain.One person is sent to get a higher 
education. The cost is covered by work, credit, or other means. These costs are 
assumed by other family members, including siblings. This risk sometimes fails, but 
when it succeeds the person earns a degree and then sends money back to the farm if 
they are able to acquire a job. The graduate is allowed a life outside farming, reducing 
their personal risk while simultaneously reducing the risk of farming by sending 
money home. Thus risk is managed within the family unit.  
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 The Land Center conceptualizes one means of managing risk as ownership of 
a gamousa (تسوماج), or buffalo (Land Center for Human Rights; 2001B, p. 17;World 
Bank, 1993; p. 42). Buffalos are fed berseem (ميسرب), or clover. The farmer grows 
berseem on his or her own land and feeds it to the buffalo (World Bank, 1993; p. 42). 
Cash input is thus lowered by the utilization of family labor and the re-use of seed.. 
Buffalos are a source of milk, butter, and cheese to small farmers but they also 
provide a crucial link in the social safety net. Excess milk, butter, and cheese can be 
sold for extra cash, and if a farmer falls upon hard times, the buffalo can be sold. 
However, selling a buffalo is a contingency of last resort, because by doing so, 
farmers lose access to a valuable source of protein and fat for their children. 
Thereafter, they must purchase these things off the open market, if they can afford 
them. Moreover, keeping a buffalo has become a problem due to disease and 
increasing poverty (Land Center for Human Rights, 2001B; p. 17; Land Center for 
Human Rights, 2001A; p. 48). Buffaloes play a major role in the moral economy, 
providing protein and a source of last resort for cash, and farmers are greatly averse to 
losing them. 
 The community aspect of a moral economy is also important, and here I will 
supplement the Land Center documents to provide a larger picture. In Upper Egypt, 
marriage within a village or cluster of villages tends to be endogamous (Hopkins and 
Saad, 2004; p. 5), though this is not always the case. The Delta shares similar patterns. 
Over time, this means that due to intermarriage, many people within a small village 
are linked by family ties. In difficult times, these family members may be called upon 
to provide support for one another. While the inability to help one's family member is 
forgivable, outright refusal is not so easily pardoned. Shaming, rumors, and 
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occasionally shunning provide means of enforcement to a moral economy. Help is 
given not based on nobility or altruism, though this does sometimes play a part, but 
rather based on the idea that sometime down the line, the people obliged to give aid 
may need help themselves. Moral economy built through reciprocity is thus a means 
of spreading out risk and providing social insurance. 
Zakat (ةاكز‎) and the Religious Aspect of Moral Economy 
 In order to better understand the moral economy present in the Egyptian 
countryside, a discussion of the means by which it is enforced is needed. While 
shaming and shunning provide a means of enforcement, so does religion. Zakat 
comprises one of the five pillars of Islam. Zakat has both obligatory and voluntary 
forms. Muslims are obligated to give zakat on profits, livestock, and agricultural 
produce. In more recent years, zakat has also been paid on stocks, bonds, and other 
financial instruments (Ali Atia, 2008; p. 60). In Egypt, zakat is considered to 
constitute a flat 2.5% of income (Ali Atia, 2008; p. 60). Thus zakat provides religious 
enforcement of moral economy. By giving zakat, a person is considered pious and 
generous. Failure to give zakat then constitutes evidence of greed and impiety. Since 
obligatory zakat is based on profit, livestock, agricultural produce, mines or buried 
treasure, stocks, and bonds, it is something that is levied on all who are able. 
Moreover, because the wealthy make more profit, have more agricultural produce, 
and own more livestock, more zakat is expected from them than from others. 
Moreover, zakat is a right of the poor (Ali Atia, 2008; p. 36). Zakat is not merely 
based on the obligation of the rich to give, but a right of the poor to demand.   
Therefore zakat comprises a means of social redistribution of wealth. As such, it is not 
meant to equalize income, but rather to protect the poor and to ensure social stability 
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and harmony. Yet because zakat is both a right of the poor and a religious obligation 
of all who are able, the moral economy inherent in it is enforceable by pointing to 
religious obligation. 
 I must stress that moral economy does not mean the absence of exploitation. 
Moral economy is not a utopian system. It is quite the opposite: a means of surviving 
in a distinctly non-utopian system of exploitation. The question is not whether or not 
small farmers in Egypt are exploited, but rather whether or not they see this 
exploitation as acceptable or equitable. Whether or not something is actually equitable 
is much less important than whether or not it is seen as equitable. Even prior to Law 
96, farmers were still subject to exploitation. The state set prices for crops and 
demanded crop quotas (Mitchell, 2002; p. 251). The crop prices were artificially low 
(Mitchell, 2002; p. 251), although there were ways around this problem. Moreover, 
while land tenure laws favored tenants the entirety of the system made it difficult for 
small farmers to displace the wealthy class. The difference between the time before 
and after Law 96 is not the presence or absence of exploitation, but the perception of 
equity. Small farmers may or may not have seen their exploitation as equitable under 
the old regime, but under the new regime they see it as distinctly inequitable. The 
change, however, has not been in the exploitation, but the level of it. Where the state 
used to provide stability even while it exploited small farmers, now it colludes with 
businessmen and large landowners to take destroy this stability. 
The World Bank and Moral Economy 
 Because the Bank conceptualizes moral economy as risk aversion, it does not 
see the social aspects of moral economy, nor does it conceptualize risk in a fashion 
that is acceptable to small farmers. To return to the example of the buffaloes , the 
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Bank conceptualizes buffaloes as uncompetitive because they do not make a 
significant contribution to the market and they are not insured or invested (World 
Bank, 1993; p. 42). The ultimate goal for the Bank is to support livestock farms, and 
to require small farmers buy their milk, butter, and cheese from a commercial 
supplier, thus contributing to the market (World Bank, 1993; p. 42). The Bank is 
asking small farmers to stop producing their own milk, butter, and cheese grown on 
their own farms and to begin buying it elsewhere. Doing so would constitute a risk by 
itself, especially given the rising price of food in recent years. Finally, also ignored is 
the safety net aspect of owning a buffalo. Without a buffalo, farmers have no ready 
source of savings to fall back on in case of crisis, putting them at further risk. 
 On the community level, moral economy is damaged by land reform. 
Specifically, moral economy is damaged by the push for land registration and the 
changes in land rental brought on by Law 96. Moral economy is sustained in part by 
means of patron-client relationships that facilitate the redistribution of wealth. In a 
patron-client relationship, wealthy landowners are sometimes relied upon to provide 
extra support in times of need in exchange for extra services or considerations from 
their dependent client. However, the altered tenure system and land registration has 
compromised these sets of relationships. First of all, many large landowners colluded 
with the state in the passing of Law 96 of 1992 in order to be able to charge higher 
land rents. By giving the landowners the opportunity to evict tenants from the land 
without much legal oversight, Law 96 presented landlords with an opportunity to take 
back their land without regard to the usual social obligations. Settlements were not 
reached and no respect was given to the rights of tenants because once the legal 
framework was gone it was more profitable not to engage in negotiation. Moreover, 
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the improved land registration could make the purchase of land simpler. Since large 
landowners would be in a position to purchase or rent large amounts of land, they 
would be less inclined to help smallholders in need. Instead, they could simply buy 
them out or wait until the property came up for rental. Moreover, due to corruption, 
opportunities arise to force small farmers to give up their land regardless of ownership 
rights. Large landowners find themselves in a position where it is possible to bribe the 
police or manipulate the court systems to achieve their goals. The Land Center has 
documented the systematic arrest and beating of many small farmers in the efforts to 
get them to sign over their land (Land Center for Human Rights, 2001B; 9-20). 
Therefore, the wealthy are an increasingly unreliable source of support for small 
farmers. They have been provided with a series of opportunities to vastly increase 
their wealth with few restrictions. The result has been ongoing violence in the 
countryside as wealthy landowners attempt to acquire land by any means they deem 
necessary. As pressure increases on small farmers due to rising prices and decreasing 
social safety nets, violence over other disputes has also increased (Land Center for 
Human Rights, 2002; p. 134-138). Nonviolent disputes are also likely increasing, 
though they do not tend to be recorded. 
 The Bank does not see the importance of zakat to the overall social structure. 
By advocating a decrease in the social safety net, such as eliminating input subsidies 
(World Bank, 1993; p. 16), removing tenure (World Bank, 1993; p. 32), and 
continuing pressure on the government to eliminate the subsidies on bread, sugar, and 
flour, the Bank advocates offloading cost onto individuals. These costs to the budget 
of the poor must be made up for somewhere, and zakat is one such place. Therefore 
the Bank puts increasing pressure on zakat and the wider moral economy to fill in the 
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gaps. Yet in poor economic times, the rich are no more likely to increase giving than 
anyone else. In fact, forms of zakat such as Ramadan tables have decreased in recent 
years due to increasing economic pressure. Moreover, Weber argues that under a 
capitalist system earning profit is seen as a virtuous act (Weber, 1904; p. 232), and 
profits are hard-earned. This perspective has not been lost on the wealthy in the 
Egyptian countryside, especially with the means provided to them by a corrupt state to 
simply take by force what they cannot buy. Because of the importance of piety in 
Egyptian society, it is very unlikely that zakat will disappear, but it it is also unlikely 
to keep up with the current changes. It is odd that the Bank does not recognize such a 
crucial part of the moral economy, particularly given the underlying neo-liberal 
assumption inherent in offloading risk onto individuals. If private sector is supposed 
to take up the protection of the poor in the absence of the state then zakat could 
logically provide an integral part of this process. 
 Credit presents a problem in the context of moral economy. As a lender, the 
Bank considers a primary credit a primary solution to everything. One of the goals of 
creating a land market was to allow farmers to use their land as collateral (Bush, 
2002; p. 21). However, the credit that the Bank wishes to offer is of a particular kind. 
This type of credit is legal, official, and administered through a bank somewhere. It is 
paid back in installments and charges interest. Loans taken out in this way are given 
by the World Bank for a particular reason. Most loans are structured with monthly 
payments over a period of a several years. However, Egyptian farmers often have 
significant  amounts of cash only every few months, after a new crop is harvested. 
Other sources of cash from off-farm labor for example,  provide a substantial portion 
of income, but they can be irregular. The need to make a monthly payment can drive 
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farmers into more regular wage-labor and further away from what is already part-time 
farming to make ends meet.  
 Farmers have proven reluctant to take this sort of credit for several reasons. 
First of all, wage-labor in the country-side can be irregular. Second, farmers are 
already leveraged. When a service is needed in the countryside, it can sometimes be 
paid in cash or in kind. Credit in this case takes the form of delayed payment 
(Hopkins, 1987; p. 90). People pay as they are able, but the most reliable means of 
settling debt is usually the harvest. A farmer is thus leveraged from harvest to harvest 
on the strength of his or her crop. This leveraging constitutes a means of risk 
management and a part of the moral economy. If the crop fails, or is less than 
expected, a farmer still has other options to pay the debt such as selling buffaloes or a 
small portion of land. The merchant's risk is lower because they can claim their due 
from whatever there is of the crop, thus reducing their possible losses in the event of 
the farmer's inability to pay. However, if a farmer is already leveraged in this way, it 
would seem unlikely that they would be willing to further leverage themselves by 
taking out a bank loan. Their means of payment are committed elsewhere. Moreover, 
there is an understandable reluctance present to switch from using a crop as collateral 
to using land as collateral. Whereas within the old system risk is shared between 
merchant and farmer, in the Bank's model most of the risk is borne by farmers. The 
stakes are far higher with land than they are with crops, especially since the value of 
land is so high. The loans may be larger, but in the event of failure to pay, the farmer 
has no resources to fall back on. Where the crop may once have been claimed as 
payment, now the land is payment. Therefore it is understandable that farmers would 
be reluctant to take out a loan. Third, there are moral injunctions against taking credit 
 70 
out in this fashion. Both paying interest on loans and receiving interest on deposits 
has been identified by Islamic law as riba or usury, and it is forbidden (Abdullah 
Mouawad, 2009). Presented with this challenge, the Bank found it useful to charge for 
management and other related fees instead of collecting interest (World Bank, 2003; 
p. 61). In addition, in response to the growing popularity of Islamic finance, the 
government was persuaded by the International Financial Institutions, including the 
World Bank, to convince one of the sheikhs of Al Azhar, Mohammed Sayyid Tantawi 
(later the Grand Mufti), to issue a fatwa stating that taking interest on loans and 
deposits was not forbidden as long as the profits and losses were known in advance 
(Abdullah Mouawad, 2009; p. 80-81). While religion should not be confused with 
moral economy, the role it plays here in enforcing a moral economy cannot be ignored 
and neither can the Bank's manipulation of religion to serve its own ends. 
 The Bank's view of the state as a facilitator of commerce instead of a 
participant in the complex system of relationships that creates a moral economy also 
presents problems. The Land Center views the state as a protector, and farmers in 
rural Egypt do likewise. Therefore, the removal of the social safety net embodied 
within government jobs, input subsidies, and land laws, is seen as a violation of the 
social contract and the state's role as the protector in the moral economy. While the 
Bank acknowledges the dependence of the people on the state, it does not recognize 
the social importance or the possible consequences of altering that relationship. Social 
unrest has been a problem for years in Egypt prior to the January 25
th
 uprising. Small 
farmers blocked up the roads in Dakhalia in 2005 and 2006, and factory workers have 
been striking for the past few years in Tanta and elsewhere. The options provided by a 
moral economy have in large part exhausted because the state abandoned its role as 
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protector and patron and this has resulted in social unrest. Moreover, the Bank was 
unable to predict these problems because it does not see the state in the same way that 
organizations such as the Land Center do. 
Discourses of Exploitation: the Bank and Small Farmers 
 The Bank did not anticipate the aforementioned failures because it does not 
consider increasing exploitation or its effect on moral economy. From its perspective, 
farmers are victims of economic dislocation (World Bank, 1993; p. 71), a necessary 
evil in a transitioning economy. In actuality, the policies the Bank has advocated have 
created a moral hazard within the moral economy. The persistent state of corruption 
within the countryside that had previously been managed by a combination of moral 
economy and national law has been altered by Bank-backed land reforms. The state is 
no longer serving its role as the protector. The opportunity has arisen for landowners 
with sufficient power to force small farmers to either give up their land or sell out. 
This exploitation can take the form of bribing police to falsely arrest and abuse 
farmers such as the Land Center describes (Land Center for Human Rights, 2001B), 
price manipulation such as in the fertilizer monopolies, or the abuse of government 
ministries for the purposes of gain (Land Center for Human Rights, 2002; p. 132). 
These actions constitute a moral hazard because the state is no longer protecting small 
farmers from large landowners and businessmen. Consequently, large landowners are 
able to bribe police and abuse the court systems with little or no risk to themselves. 
Legal battles take money or state protection to fight, and every year the poor have less 
of both. They do not have the means to turn the tables and prosecute landowners, 
manipulate the prices themselves, or bribe the police, and the state is no longer 
protecting them. Exploitation increases, and the old notions of social justice and 
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equity are swept away. Yet new notions of equity and social justice have not yet taken 
hold while the moral economy is in transition. The Bank characterizes this transition 
as “sensitizing” farmers to the market and encouraging innovation (World Bank, 
1993; p. 12). In essence, though the Bank wants to transform the moral economy, it 
misconstrues as tradition and risk aversion, into a market economy, again 
misconstrued by the Bank as innovation and progress.  
 However, moral economy does not exist in the absence of a market. There has 
always been a market in Egypt connected to the outside world. What has changed is 
the level of articulation between farmers and the market. Prior to structural 
adjustment,  farmer contact with the market was largely articulated by the state. The 
state subsidized most inputs, demanded crop quotas, and set procurement prices. 
Thus, the state thus served as a shield from the market and as a means of exploitation. 
After structural adjustment, the contact of small farmers with the market has been 
mediated by large landowners, corporations, and merchants. The state has withdrawn 
from market participation in the form of crop quotas, inputs, procurement prices, and 
land tenure. Landowners, corporations, and merchants have little interest in protecting 
small farmers from the market because they profit equally from the success or failure 
of small farmers. Capitalist logic argues that the market creates winners and losers. If 
small farmers succeed, then they sell more produce to their mediators, guaranteeing 
more profit for both sides. If, however, small farmers fail, then businessmen or Banks 
are able to buy up or claim the land of these small farmers and use it to their own 
ends. An example of this capitalist logic and its relationship to corruption can be 
found in the Agricultural Bank of Egypt. The Agricultural Bank is responsible for 
giving out loans to small farmers in Egypt. However, the Agricultural Bank has also 
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been accused of giving out loans that have not been requested and doubling loans 
without an additional disbursement (Land Center for Human Rights, 2003; p. 17). The 
Agricultural Bank reclaims their land or utilizes the police to harass farmers who 
cannot repay these illegal loans (Land Center for Human Rights, 2003; p. 2). This 
attitude violates the notions of social justice and reciprocity common in moral 
economy and allows for an increasing level of exploitation that was not possible prior 
to reform due to the a number of subsidies and the Abdel-Nasser's tenancy law. The 
combination of moral economy and land laws in Egypt prior to 1992 meant that in 
order to maintain their status in the community, the wealthy were better served by 
responding to the protests of  small farmers than by ignoring them. Large landowners 
could not easily remove tenants (Saad, 2002; p. 109), so they were better served by 
treating them well. The difficulty involved in land transfer combined with the loss of 
prestige meant that large landowners had little to gain by attempting to dispossess 
small farmers. However, with the state protections removed, large landowners can buy 
land where they once might have helped others to keep it. The danger of loss of 
prestige is overpowered by the opportunity for gain. As such, the exploitative 
mediation and articulation of the state has been replaced by the increasingly 
exploitative mediation and articulation of merchants, large landowners, and 
corporations. The moral economy that once lent the system stability is shifting to a 
new form. Market contact has moved from the state, a singular entity whose interest 
in its own stability mitigated the level of exploitation, to multiple non-state entities 
that are unconcerned with stability and benefit equally from success or failure. 
Therefore exploitation has been increased by rising prices and corruption and the 
moral economy has been disrupted. 
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 In addition to the changing means of exploitation, the Bank also overlooks the 
human dignity of the exploited and the exploiter. As Freire points out, the ontological 
problem with exploitation is that it dehumanizes both the oppressed and the oppressor 
(Freire, 1993; p. 44). Disruption of moral economy goes beyond social upheaval. 
Moral economy is built on reciprocal exchanges in which perceived social justice is 
paramount (Scott, 1976; p. 163). The loss of social justice brought on by disrupting 
the moral economy is therefore dehumanizing to both the oppressed and the 
oppressor. However, this loss is felt the most strongly by the oppressed. This has been 
expressed most eloquently in by a worker at the Land Center for Human Rights: “The 
purpose of the World Bank is to serve the western powers, take from the poor, and 
give to the rich.” The problem with this statement is not that it is flatly wrong, but that 
from his perspective, it is perfectly true. What is being described here is a relationship 
of exploitation where dignity and justice do not matter. The anger it provoked in this 
particular informant was palpable. As his comment shows, the increasing 
marginalization and indignity suffered by the poor has not gone unnoticed. People are 
not just aware that the moral economy has been disrupted or that they have been 
impoverished, but also that the Bank has played a part in it. Despite the Bank's claims 
of benevolence, they are seen as an oppressor concerned only with themselves. A 
view like this would not hold much water if there was not at least some truth to it. 
Rights or reciprocity such as those found in moral economy are mentioned in Bank 
reports, but they are given short shrift. Reciprocity is all too often in the form of the 
most convenient means of payment for the more powerful party while rights are given 
only so far as they allow the Bank to attain its own goals, such as in the case of the 
Bank's guidelines for land acquisition, where farmers are offered community 
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development funds in exchange for their land (World Bank, 2011; p. 119). All of this 
leads to the devaluation of human dignity as the powerful are allowed to simply take 
what they want at the expense of the poor. 
 Yet the Bank holds little in the way of a concept of reciprocity because they do 
not see the power relationships that are made manifest in the actions of both poor 
farmers and wealthy landowners. A bit of explanation is required here. Capitalism is 
built on the concept of equal exchange. However, equal exchange can only take place 
in a legal framework that enforces it. The Bank defines equal exchange as a fair price 
for goods made within a framework in which both parties are equally informed about 
the benefits and risks involved. However, the Bank's own framework violates this 
principle and denies reciprocity. Take for example equal exchange. The absence of the 
concept of reciprocity from the perspective of the Bank is evidenced by its 
willingness to advocate forms of exchange that are inherently unequal. In the Bank's 
document on land acquisition, they argue for equal exchange. However, they 
simultaneously argue that the exchange for land can take the form of land in kind or a 
community fund (Deininger et al., 2011; p. 119). This form of equal exchange is 
hardly fair. No one piece of land is exactly like another, and it is all too easy to force 
someone off of a developed piece of land onto an undeveloped one. Thus it is 
exchange in kind: land for land, but is the tracts exchanged are not equal. Of course, 
this is proposed quite apart from the likelihood that no farmer would willingly give up 
his or her land in exchange for a community development fund. Such a proposal 
would necessarily imply coercion, which would deny both reciprocity and the 
principle of equal exchange and would violate the principles of moral economy. In 
denying reciprocity and any form of equal exchange, the Bank rules out social justice 
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and violates moral economy.  
Conclusions: The Revolution and the Severed Social Contract 
 In this chapter I have described the increasing exploitation of small farmers by 
large landowners as a result of official corruption and Bank-backed reforms. I have 
also described the abdication of the state's function as the protector of small farmers 
from the market and its effects on Egyptian farmers. Furthermore, I have discussed 
the social reciprocity inherent in a moral economy as understood by the Land Center 
for Human Rights and proposed that the Bank itself ignores reciprocity as a critical 
part of equitable development.  The result of these issues is an increasing exploitation 
of small farmers that the moral economy is ill-suited to account for and mitigate. 
 After the revolution on January 25
th 
2011, the ability of the landowning classes 
to maintain this exploitation and install new ideas of social justice and equity now lies 
in question. The old government has fallen, state security has been shut down, and 
police powers have been severely restricted. The backing that large landowners once 
received from the government and police forces is likely weakening as well. Farmers 
have already begun to organize and demand their own unions. Changes in moral 
economy that might be enacted on structural adjustment by the subsequent revolution 
may appear in the next few years. 
 Moreover, the severing of the old social contract with the state as understood by 
the Land Center for Human Rights has not resulted in a new one. The state now 
provides almost no protection to small farmers. Input subsidies are gone, and the state 
no longer provides a guaranteed floor price for crops. The tenancy system instituted 
by Abdel-Nasser has been completely obliterated, and even those who own their land 
have not been secure. Large landowners often bribe the police to torture and imprison 
 77 
small landowners so that they will sign away their land. Those who lose their land 
wind up as either day laborers or migrate to the city or an administrative center to live 
in slums. Cultural shift and poor economic times lead to farmers being increasingly 
unable to rely on each other. Yet it is difficult to argue that this is not the Bank's goal, 
or that the Bank's project has been a failure. The Bank wants to “modernize” Egypt. 
For its vision to be realized, some things have to change, and change is based on 
pressure. Under the old system, farmers may not have done well, but there was little 
pressure to force them into a new way of thinking or acting. Yet smallholders do not 
possess the resources to generate capital in the way the Bank imagines. In context 
moral economy was devised to support just this type of capital-poor system. 
Therefore land reform would only be able to cause social change if it was radical 
enough to render moral economy insufficient. If the Bank's project is to induce social 
change, and at least until January 25
th
, it was succeeding. 
 In this process of change, organizations such as the Land Center have had little 
voice. Despite the Land Center's protestations and requests for state protection, the 
state seems to be receding from its role as a protector. Moreover, the recent reforms 
have damaged the ability of small farmers to send their children to school, not only 
inhibiting the Bank's stated project of “modernization”, but also limiting the social 
security that the Land Center acknowledges education can provide. The outcome of 
this process is as of yet unclear, but it would seem that social equity has been violated 
and the positive role that the Land Center holds the potential to play has been negated. 
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Chapter 4: Education 
Introduction 
 
 In this chapter I propose the Bank's view of education as a means of 
production that creates social capital and as a way to produce modernity. I follow with 
a discussion of the neo-liberal reforms enacted in the course of the Bank's educational 
policies. I then rase questions concerning the production of modernity and social 
capital through education arguing that the Bank's view of education denies co-
temporality. I present the Land Center's view on education, and detail how the Bank 
devalues local knowledge through its educational program. Finally, I conclude with a 
discussion of the overall purpose and effect of the Bank's education project in Egypt. 
The Egyptian Educational System 
 I begin with a short overview of the official system of education in Egypt. 
Education begins in primary school, which extends from grades 1-5. Secondary 
education begins at grade 6 and goes through grade 8 (Arab Republic of Egypt, 2007; 
p. 28). Private and religious schools are available for primary, secondary, and higher 
education. Secondary education is divided into a scientific and literary section 
followed by technical tracks including agricultural, industrial, and commercial 
schools (Arab Republic of Egypt, 2007; p. 28). Those who complete secondary 
education may apply for entrance to higher education by the taking the Thanaweyya 
Amma (تماع تيونت) (Arab Republic of Egypt, 2007; p. 28), or general secondary, exam. 
Passing this exam permits students to apply for higher education. Kindergarten is also 
available, though this falls outside the purview of government ministries (Arab 
Republic of Egypt, 2007; p. 28). Despite these broad goals, however, education rarely 
functions in the fashion officially described. 
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 The educational system in Egypt has far less structure than this description 
would imply. As accounts of the people who have attended Egyptian schools point 
out, children do not always go straight through the proper grade system. As Sayyid 
Qutb describes in his autobiography, wealth and prestige may mean that a student 
from a wealthier family enters at a higher grade level or receives more attention than 
other students from poorer families would (Qutb, 2004; p. 10). Private tutoring may 
also be an option for wealthier families, while the cost may be prohibitive for poorer 
ones. Moreover, literacy rates indicate that every family that can sends their child to 
school for as long as it can afford to. The early years of schooling often provide a 
weeding out process. If the child does not do well, he or she is pulled out and put to 
work, and girls are often pulled out much faster than boys. Thus dropout rates are 
reflective not only of financial status, but also of perceived student ability. There are 
also private schools, and kuttabs, or religious schools where Quranic recitation is 
taught.. It is entirely possible for students to attend kuttab, public school, and private 
school in the course of their education. School is also divided up into primary, 
intermediate-secondary, and secondary, something that the government's layout does 
not account for. Students may also alternate between forms of schooling as time and 
circumstances allow, providing a much murkier picture than the official descriptions 
would imply. 
Literacy and Thanaweyya Amma 
 Literacy rates are higher in urban areas than in rural areas (Hopkins and Saad, 
2004; p. 7). Moreover, access to primary schools in rural areas remains an issue. Not 
every village possesses a primary school (Zaalouk, 2004; p. 34). Therefore, some 
families must send their children to neighboring villages in order to attend school, 
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while others do not send their children to school at all. In addition, though education 
is compulsory through secondary school, many people do not complete primary or 
secondary education, contributing to high rates of illiteracy. Also, the completion of 
primary and secondary education is not a guarantee of literacy, a problem that 
becomes apparent when comparing the 90% attendance rate of school-age children 
(Hopkins and Saad, 2004; p. 8) with overall the literacy rate of 56.6% (Hopkins and 
Saad, 2004; p. 7). Some of this discrepancy may reflect the older generation who did 
not attend school at the rates of the younger generation, the problems still remains. 
Moreover, private tutoring also presents a problem. Teachers involved in private 
tutoring are often the same teachers that educate these children in the classroom. 
Therefore, they face immense pressure for their students to pass the thanaweyya 
amma, sometimes leading to teachers helping students pass the exam by giving them 
answers or correcting their work. This means that thanaweyya amma may not be a 
reliable indicator of educational attainment in all cases. 
Education as the Means of Modernization 
 
 The Bank sees education as a means of production that creates human capital 
and as a machine that produces modernity. Education is meant not only to provide 
knowledge in the form of human capital, but also to teach people the particular 
outlook that the Bank characterizes as modern. In the push for education the Bank is 
at least partially aligned with popular conceptions of appropriate development. 
Education is necessary for success in a capitalist economy. Therefore, the Bank 
engages in a broad-based program that invests in public primary schools (World 
Bank, 2004B), private secondary schools, and public secondary schools (World Bank, 
1999). Focus is given to technical skills, the English language, and a broad general 
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education. 
Education and the Mind of Modernity  
 For the Bank, education is a machine that produces modernity. The Bank  
argues that education is essential for modernization. Therefore, the Bank strongly 
associates education with the development of cognitive ability (World Bank, 1998; p. 
40). They state that education signals a worker's capacity to learn new skills (World 
Bank, 1998; p. 40). Moreover, they also state “poor individuals might earn lower 
returns on the same level of education because individuals with characteristics other 
than schooling, such as ability and motivation, tend to benefit more from education” 
(World Bank, 2008; p. 30).  This viewpoint shows a strong bias towards educating the 
wealthy over the poor, and seems to imply that the poor are unable to utilize education 
effectively because they are somehow inert or less able. Moreover, education serves 
as a means for the Bank to spread its regime of knowledge and power. Education 
provides a means for introducing a new order into Egypt. When the dialectic of 
modernity and tradition is posed, modernity is conceived as existing not only in 
technology, but also in the mind. The Bank does not just see modernity as a set of 
technologies that people use. Modernity is integrated into minds and bodies. 
The Banking Concept of Education, Social Capital, and the Production of Modernity 
 The Bank views education as a means of production that creates social capital.   
More aptly, this is known as the “banking” concept of education. For clarity's sake, 
note that this is not related to to the World Bank itself. Much as knowledge must flow 
from the core to the periphery (World Bank, 1998; p. 2), and from those who have it 
to those who do not, students are similarly seen as empty vessels to be filled by 
teachers. Thus the macro-dialectic is reproduced in the micro-dialectic, and vice-
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versa, as knowledge flows from the top down. Moreover, once students as vessels are 
“full”, or have graduated, then they are considered to possess social capital. This 
capital results from making connections, meeting new people, developing marketable 
skills, and gaining the prestige that goes with education. The skills, relationships, and 
prestige then allow graduates to find jobs.  
 In order to create more kinds of social capital, the Bank also emphasizes the 
development of many different educational tracks (World Bank, 1999; p. 5). This 
emphasis does not exclude vocational tracks, it merely means that everyone is to 
receive a general education. In addition, the Bank's focus even extends to the general 
education facilities in Al Azhar (World Bank, 2004B; p. 33). However, it is unclear 
how much progress has been made in convincing Al Azhar to receive Bank support 
(World Bank, 2004B; p. 33). The social capital produced from a solid education then 
allows graduates to develop the structure of the Bank's modernity. The Bank measures 
its performance by the number of skilled workers produced (World Bank, 1989; p. vi) 
and placed in jobs (World Bank, 1999; p. 82). In the area of job placement, graduates 
in the early 1990s found a great deal of success in construction and work abroad 
(World Bank, 1995; p. 8). The Bank has seen less success in placing graduates in 
more recent years. However, the purpose of these programs is for graduates to utilize 
the new skills and relationships they develop in the course of their education to work 
in factories, large farms, and other industries thus producing the Bank's vision of 
modernity. 
Neo-liberalism and the Problems of Changing Education 
 Neo-liberal reforms and the Chicago School of Economics strongly oppose 
government intervention in favor of an open market. This market-oriented approach 
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extends to schools as well. The Bank does not support government subsidies in the 
form of student loans, but rather supports scholarships  (World Bank, 1998; p. 52). 
This appears as somewhat contradictory because despite their binding nature, loans 
can allow far more people to go to school whereas scholarships are awarded to only a 
few people. Moreover, if the objective is to integrate people into the economy, then 
student debt is a far more certain means of doing it. Debts require steady payments, 
while scholarships require none. A person in debt due to student loans must find a job 
to pay back the loans. Therefore they have an incentive to leave farming, an unreliable 
source of cash income, and engage in wage-labor.  
 The Bank also supports   privatizing schools as well as making people pay for 
school, euphemistically called “demand-side financing” (World Bank, 1998; p. 9). 
Hence the Bank engaged in an educational project to reform general education in 
secondary schools, but it focused on 315 commercial schools instead of public 
schools (World Bank, 1999; p. 31). Yet public funding for primary schools and 
government subsidies to public secondary education are precisely the means allowing 
poorer children in rural areas to go to school in the first place. Government provides 
capital that individuals alone cannot. Moreover, the Bank's advanced agricultural 
training programs take place in universities (World Bank, 1999; p. 9). Only those with 
significant means can afford to send their children to tertiary education, even with 
public funding. Finally, Bank-backed policy in other areas has resulted in small 
farmers being unable to send their children to school due to lack of funds (Land 
Center for Human Rights, 2001C; p. 8-9). Instead, these would-be scholars are 
working the fields, much to the chagrin of their parents. 
The Problem of Producing Modernity 
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 The Bank is engaged in a process of attempting to educate people into 
modernity. Education is not only a means to create a modern infrastructure, but to 
create modern citizens. However, modernity itself is not above question. As Said 
(1973) and others have pointed out, the West has based its identity not on what it is, 
but on what it is not. In this case, the West is identified as wealthier nations such as 
the United States and those in Europe. The West's other is the East. Since the West 
discursively defines itself as “modern”, innovative, adaptable, and liberal (Long, 
1977; p. 28), the East is defined as “traditional”, ignorant, passive, and inert (Long, 
1977; p. 33). This problem is reified in the World Bank's notion of education as a 
banking system. In the banking concept of education, students are mere vessels to be 
filled. Students are therefore seen as traditional, receptive, and inert, ready to be filled 
with the ideas of modernity. Teachers are authority figures, but as Freire points out, 
authority is confused with the authority of knowledge (Freire, 1993; p 73). In this 
case, the authority of knowledge is derived from a conception of modernity meant not 
only to fill students with knowledge, but also to reify the authority structure that 
students will encounter later on in life. Students learn to be passive receptacles for the 
knowledge of modernity given by their teachers so that later on they will be passive 
and docile wage laborers.  
 While land reform and the destruction of moral economy may be a means of 
transforming geography and breaking social ties, education serves as a means of 
producing a structure of domination that justifies the actions of the Bank. The 
discourse contained within modernity that tradition is negative and modernity is 
positive serves as a justification for the transformation taking place. Since tradition 
holds people back, then becoming modern is the solution. Education provides the 
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means to transform traditional people into modern people who accept the changes 
forced on them as an inevitable part of becoming modern. Yet the tradition/modernity 
dialectic that underlies the banking concept of education ignores the process that 
productes the dialectic itself. Tradition and modernity are not in fact realities in the 
absolute sense, but rather are produced by an interaction of West and East, North and 
South, and institution and individual. Modernity was created to justify the position of 
the West as wealthy and powerful, while tradition was accepted at least in part by the 
East as a means by which to obtain the wealth and power of the West. This is not to 
say that the power differential played no part, but rather, as Freire would point out, the 
oppressed has internalized the oppressor (Freire, 1993; p. 63). Because the East does 
wish to be like the West in the sense of having wealth and power, the East, at least in 
part, has internalized the discourse of tradition and modernity and made it its own. In 
the countryside, this internalization is manifest in the form of material acquisition. 
Acquiring more land can be about becoming a large landowner (Freire, 1993; p. 64-
65) instead of becoming better able to support one's family, to improve the quality of 
life, or to gain prestige, though those may be aspirations as well. The important thing 
is that the latter things become de-emphasized as material acquisition becomes an end 
in itself. When individual profit is emphasized over all else, then quality of life 
becomes individualized instead of being a common value, because the underlying 
paradigm of capitalist modernity is that by helping oneself first, others benefit. 
Moreover, if profit is the ultimate goal of capitalist modernity, then the vessels are 
never full. The production of “modern” individuals created by the banking concept of 
education integrates people into a reality of alienation that is common to capitalism. 
By being disconnected from land and others in the pursuit of profit which as petty 
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commodity producers they cannot attain, farmers are alienated from the land which 
they work, the products that they produce, their fellow worker, and the owners for 
whom they work. Therefore, the banking concept of education produces the particular 
kind of alienation that is necessary for individuals to function in capitalism. 
 This conception of modernity and tradition has leaked into the predominant 
paradigm of development, modernization theory. Modernization theory seeks to put 
traditional societies through the same process that Western capitalist democracies 
went through on their way to “modernity”. This process goes from tradition to 
industrialization to modernity (Long, 1977; p. 9-11), and it yields an intense focus on 
technological advancement and training. Private and differentiated factories are 
emphasized over older means of production and service industries because the Bank 
sees such factories as necessary for the progression to modernity. The West, however, 
did not go through the process of tradition to industrialization to modernity nearly so 
smoothly as this narrative implies. The process of industrialization was full of stops 
and starts, elisions and omissions (Foucault, 1982; p. 4-5). Yet when the Bank treats 
education as a process of modernization, it reifies notions of traditional or inert people 
and denies them agency. In this model, knowledge must flow from the core to the 
periphery, from those who have it to those who do not. This assumption of ignorance 
or lack of ability on the part of Egyptian farmers only serves to reify an already 
powerful narrative in Egypt that characterizes farmers as untrustworthy and lazy 
fellahin. By treating farmers as objects to be acted upon rather than a full-fledged 
human beings with intelligence, needs, wants, and desires, the Bank disenfranchises 
and marginalizes farmers. As a result, the empowering possibilities inherent in 
education are compromised because the Bank's discourse only serves to marginalize 
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those who either refuse to or cannot participate in the Bank's project of 
modernization. Yet it is worth noting that the problem here is not the idea of education 
itself. Education is highly valuable and provides many benefits. The problem is the 
particular way in which the Bank sees the people to be educated. By viewing small 
farmers and the poor as inert or less able, the Bank discounts their ability to both 
receive and take advantage of education. Moreover, because the Bank sees the poor or 
small farmers as inert vessels to be filled, it denies them the ability to participate fully 
in their education and diminishes the chance of customized services or helpful 
financing options. 
 However, education is not a reliable means of producing modernity or social 
capital. Social capital may be created in the form of agricultural knowledge, but it is 
not being used by smallholders very often. This is the case when, as in Egypt, there 
are simply not enough jobs available for new graduates. The Bank characterizes the 
educated unemployed as having “luxury unemployment” (Horton, Kanbur, and 
Mazumdar, 1994; p. 15). Luxury unemployment can be more clearly defined as 
education that does not lead to wage labor. However, unemployment is only a luxury 
if one has a choice in the matter. In the case of smallholders, “luxury unemployment” 
likely means farm work, not a lack of labor at all. Moreover, there is often a 
correlation between education and social status. Educated people sometimes refuse to 
perform tasks or take jobs because the level of education required is beneath their own 
(Bach, 1998; p. 191-192). Indeed, some employers may be reluctant to hire educated 
people, because they believe that as soon as a better opportunity arises, the graduate 
will leave. This is often a correct assumption. Minimum-wage jobs are often viewed 
as a stopgap measure by graduates until they can find better employment. Moreover, 
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education is not necessarily transferable. Someone with a degree in manufacturing or 
engineering may be ill-suited to manage a large farm or work at a bank. Education 
opens doors, but it closes them as well. Yet neither of these phenomena are unique to 
Egypt's countryside. People with higher education in the United States and Europe 
routinely refuse to take minimum-wage jobs out of a belief that they can do better. 
The Bank should be less eager to reject a decision by Egyptians that many Westerners 
make at one time or another. Social capital is not a reliable means of producing 
change or even finding a job. 
 Finally, the effect of the creation of multiple kinds of social capital through 
many educational tracks also means that education is not a means of producing a 
particular kind of modernity. The programs for emphasizing advanced agricultural 
technology that target the countryside are not an optimum choice for smallholders 
because as petty commodity producers, smallholders do not possess a great deal of 
capital for the purchase of expensive farming equipment and have less chance of 
being able to utilize these technologies. As evidenced by the very small enrollments in 
advanced agricultural programs (World Bank, 2010; p. 181) and the subsequent lack 
of jobs for graduates with degrees in agriculture (World Bank, 2010; p. 182), 
smallholders are aware that they cannot afford these technologies, and instead send 
their children to obtain other degrees. Moreover, farmers do not send their children to 
learn about agriculture based on the well-founded assumption that they already know 
how to farm. Advanced degrees are meant to allow graduates from smallholder 
families to obtain jobs outside of agriculture. The only people who can typically 
afford to own  advanced agricultural technology are large landowners. The 
bourgeoisie in this case may be large landowning families or urban families that wish 
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to maintain a farm outside of Cairo. The social capital and skills obtained by the 
wealthy are then used to manage large farms that generate capital. The production of 
capital by the already wealthy does not change the social structure and produce 
modernity. Instead this situation reinforces the social structure and increases the 
income gap. Scholars refer to this situation as the social reproductive function of 
education (Bernstein, 1996; p. 53). In developed countries, education does not just 
serve to create social capital and workers, but to reinforce the class structure 
(Bernstein, 1996; p. 53). The profusion of tracks within the primary educational 
system in the United States, such as gifted and talented or advanced placement 
programs (which I myself took part in), serve to reinforce class structure much as the 
Bank's projects are doing in Egypt. Children in advanced programs often attend only 
advanced classes and do not have much interaction with children in regular education 
programs. Class sizes are smaller in these programs, so students receive more 
instruction from teachers and receive stronger support to obtain college degrees. 
Unsurprisingly, the children in advanced programs usually happen to be wealthier 
than those in regular education. In the end, children in advanced programs are more 
likely than children in regular education to receive college degrees and increase 
incomes, thus reinforcing class structure. By focusing on the privatization of schools 
and emphasizing advanced agricultural technologies that the poor may only rent, the 
Bank is inadvertently achieving the same goal and reinforcing the class structure in 
Egypt. 
Education and the Denial of Co-Temporality 
 “Il-Haraka Baraka” 
 The above saying comes from Upper Egypt (Al-Aswad, 2009; p. 58), and 
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means “movement is a blessing.” This prhase refers to the Upper Egyptian emphasis 
on staying in motion. Such an active, movement-oriented ideology seems at odds with 
the denial of co-temporality inherent in the Bank's view of education. In the Bank's 
eyes, as knowledge must flow from the active core to the inert periphery, so must 
education. There is a point that needs to be addressed here. There are undoubtedly 
educational deficiencies in the Egyptian system and outside help in educational 
reform could well be beneficial. Certain advanced skill sets are a rarity, and the people 
who do have them are often poorly trained. However, the underlying dialectic in the 
Bank's perspective cannot be ignored. The very act of powers such as the Bank 
“bringing down” education to the poor reifies notions of modernity and tradition. In 
fact, the Bank sees education as the means of “modernizing” agriculture and as a part 
of a larger modernization project in general (World Bank, 2010; p. 76). Modernity is 
needed because Egyptian farmers are living in the past. Treating farmers as traditional 
is extremely problematic in a country where popular discourse already treats farmers 
as traditional fellahin (Armbrust, 2001; p. 38). Reifying the notion of traditional 
fellahin by speaking of education as a pathway to agricultural modernity only 
reinforces a discourse that is often utilized in Egypt to justify the dispossession of 
farmers. Under this rubric, since farmers are stubborn and changeless, change must be 
forced on them, despite the mobility and desire for change present in many parts of 
Egypt. 
 Despite the documented resourcefulness of small farmers, Bank ideas of 
modernity continue to privilege the wealthy over the poor. The Bank assumes that 
being in the 75
th
 percentile of income is an indicator of higher ability, while the poor 
may earn lower wages with equal education because they lack this motivation and 
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“ability” (Fasih, 2008; p. 30). Indeed, in the same article, the Bank states that the poor 
are more likely to use drugs (Fasih, 2008; p. 14) and to engage in violence (Fasih, 
2008; p. 9). Yet the poor are highly motivated and make great efforts to educate their 
children. It is not uncommon in Egypt for children to attend a full day of school only 
to go home and spend several hours with a private tutor followed by several more 
hours of homework. Moreover, many of the poor Egyptians I have met have taught 
themselves skills such as English.   But due to the shortsighted treatment of farmers as 
ignorant and violent, the Bank suggests behavioral and mentoring programs for poorer 
areas (Fasih, 2008; p. 30). These programs do more than just help under-performing 
poor students. They are meant to change their “behavior” (Fasih, 2008; p. 30). 
Ostensibly, this behavioral change is meant to assist them in their education, but it 
also serves as a means of producing a series of behaviors that are more conducive to 
Bank policy interests. Finally, by presenting the poor as unmotivated and lacking 
innate ability, the Bank reifies notions of a traditional peasant class. The Bank sees 
rural people as inert without outside education, with no agency of their own. 
 Yet change is constant in the countryside and historically a series of profound 
changes go back at least 200 years. In the 19
th
 century, Mohammed Ali reorganized 
the countryside in order to cultivate cotton (Mitchell, 2002; p. 60). Farmers learned, 
adapted, and persevered. In 1954, Abdel Nasser instituted the first wave of agrarian 
reforms that were begun under Mohammed Naguib (Bush, 2002; p. 9). Lands were 
taken from the pasha class and redistributed to landless individuals, thereby creating a 
class of smallholders (Bush, 2002; p. 9-10). Farming had changed again. Tenancy was 
also institutionalized and rented land was made inheritable. Rent was set at seven 
times the land tax (Bush, 2002; p. 10). Crop rotations were dictated to farmers, and 
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the state bought a all or a portion of most crops. Farmers again adjusted. Then in 
1992, Law 96 was passed, removing the old institution of tenancy and creating yet 
another set of changes in the countryside (Bush, 2002; p. 18). The important thing to 
recognize is that Egyptian farmers adapted to each change with varying amounts of 
success. New systems of support were devised, and agricultural producation 
continued. The countryside has not been changeless and neither have farmers. They 
inhabit the same time and space as the rest of Egyptians and indeed, humanity. 
Though education is important, farmers are not inert without it. 
The Land Center and Education 
 “In Beni Khalil in Ghayad village there are no primary schools except a one 
 -class school. So, if any family desires to send one of its children to school, 
 they have to send them to Gabal Al-Nour Primary School or that primary 
 school in Naga` Al-A`rab in Ghayad village.” (Land Center for Human Rights, 
 2001; p. 12)  
 For the Land Center, education is a key part of development (Land Center for 
Human Rights, 1999; p. 1), yet there are serious problems with school availability. 
Education provides a means of employment outside of farming (Land Center for 
Human Rights, 2009; p. 1), a support to enable its continued success, and a means of 
obtaining a marriage partner. In many poor families only one child can afford to be 
sent to school beyond primary education. Families scrimp and save, and then send this 
child to school, often in a neighboring town or city (Land Center for Human Rights, 
2001C; p. 13). The purpose of such a degree is to allow the graduate to obtain a job 
outside of farming, though this is not guaranteed, and to send money home. When 
farmers are unable to send their children to school, it is not just an individual loss of 
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education but a loss of possible future income for a family. Yet education also grants 
the social capital to marry an educated spouse and demand a higher marriage gift 
(Bach, 1998; p. 198). In some cases, marriage to an educated partner ensures a double 
income and its resultant benefits (Bach, 1998; p. 185). In other cases, it simply 
ensures more educated children as the mother stays at home and uses what she has 
learned to care for and educate her children. Thus education is also a generational 
process. If both the father and mother are educated and at least one of them obtains a 
job with their degree that grants a modest income, it becomes possible for their 
children to obtain better educations themselves, and leave farming permanently. 
Education provides a means to positive social mobility. Moreover, these children may 
then do a better job of supporting those family members who were unable to leave 
farming, allowing some of their cousins, nieces, and nephews to gain education and 
advance class as well. 
When Discourses Collide: Education and “Stuck” Farmers 
 In treating education merely as a means of producing individual social capital 
and modernity, the Bank is sacrificing an interest it shares with farmers. This sacrifice 
is made because both parties view education instrumentally, but for different 
purposes. Farmers also send their children to school because they value education 
instrumentally. Yet ultimately, education does not serve the same purpose for farmers 
as it does for the Bank. As mentioned before, farmers expect educated children to find 
better jobs, and to find their way out of farming. In return, educated children are 
expected to support their elders and the other children who did not go to school. Thus 
education is a means out of farming and also a means of enabling family farming to 
continue. Yet the Bank instrumentalizes education as a means for advancing farming 
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at the expense of families. Therefore they push programs in institutions such as Cairo 
University that focus on teaching advanced farming techniques (World Bank, 1989; p. 
35). Yet these techniques are not clearly advantageous for smallholders. As discussed 
before, the Bank's ideal vision of farming is capital-intensive, and smallholders do not 
have this kind of capital available. Therefore, even if a smallholder goes to school at 
Cairo University and participates in these programs, the knowledge is likely to be of 
little use back on the farm. Moreover, in a case of the right hand not knowing what the 
left hand is doing, Bank policies elsewhere are preventing many farmers from sending 
their children to school at all due to lack of funds. Increasing pressures from rising 
input prices, rents, and lost subsidies mean that many children must stay home to 
work on the farm or find wage-labor elsewhere. Thus poor families are denied not 
only access to education, but also the chance to advance in class and to improve their 
quality of life. 
 Local knowledge of farming is devalued by the Bank when it over-emphasizes 
advanced technologies in its educational programs. The Bank poses technology as the 
solution to modernize agriculture. Yet it is difficult to argue that farmers in Egypt do 
not know how to work the fields because they cannot use a tractor. Farming in Egypt 
has a history that dates back over 6,000 years. At least since the Arab conquests in 
600s and 700s, farming has evolved continuously. Land races have been developed 
that have withstood the test of time. This knowledge cannot be devalued so easily by 
agri-business that has arisen in the last 150 years and remains unproven. As Mitchell 
points out with his study of the Aswan low dams, modern technology is built on a 
series of failures (Mitchell, 2002; p. 37). Each step in the building of the dams was 
fraught with failure and near-disaster. Unfortunately, modern farming technologies 
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suffer from similar problems. In 1916, the benefits of crop rotation were already well-
known in the United States (Gardner, 2001; p. 166-167). This was also the period of 
time when the mass-migration to Oklahoma and the great plains states was underway. 
Yet despite the known dangers, vast farming enterprises were being created based on 
monoculture. Farmers in the 1910s and 1920s grew the same crop in the same field 
without rotation. Yet the 1916 edition of “Traditional American Farming Techniques” 
predicts that this loss of rotation would eventually lead to disaster (Gardner, 2001; p. 
166). Fifteen years later the Dust Bowl years began. The repeated planting of wheat, 
combined with overuse of fertilizers, pesticides, and herbicides, turned the soil to dust 
and devastated the Great Plains for decades to come. Yet despite the example of the 
Dust Bowl, monoculture was exactly what the “prophets” of the green revolution 
advocated 30 years later (Shiva, 1991; p. 34). These practices, though more advanced, 
are exactly what the Bank wishes to educate Egyptian farmers on the benefits of. The 
result of such intensified agriculture has already begun to show results. Better and 
better drainage is needed for increasingly poisoned soils, and Bank-backed water-
intensive projects in the New Lands mean that coastal areas of the Nile Delta that 
have been cultivated continuously for hundreds of years are threatened with returning 
to marsh (Ayeb, 2002; p. 97). This is because Bank supported projects such as Toshka 
are responsible for diverting much of the water that once went downstream in the first 
place. While the technological “wow” factor of the New Lands cannot be denied, they 
may be ultimately unsustainable. The Bank's deep belief in technological and 
technocratic solutions is preventing it from seeing the larger picture. While the need 
to feed the people of Egypt is pressing, more low-tech solutions do have value here. 
Education in solely high-tech solutions is thus problematic because their benefits are 
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debatable and they not available to everyone. It is not that formal education is 
problematic, but that the particular kind of technological education the Bank 
emphasizes is not necessarily better than the local knowledge that is already present. 
Bank methods of agriculture can increase production, but they can also cause 
progressive and difficult to repair soil damage and strain increasingly scarce water 
resources. The old ways are not necessarily better, but the damage possible from the 
methods the Bank advocates cannot be discounted. There is a need to search for 
solutions that lie between what the Bank is advocating and traditional methods of 
farming. These methods, such as no-till or minimal tillage, are both lower-cost and 
easier on the land. Therefore the Bank's desire for everyone to have an education is 
not flawed, but its methods are. 
 Moreover, it is important to take note here of some of the positive aspects of 
Bank educational projects in Egypt. Acknowledging the problem of rural illiteracy, 
the Bank has been involved in building primary schools in multiple governorates 
(World Bank, 2004B; p. 2). It has also engaged in projects of teacher's education in 
order to further improve the condition of primary schools in the Egyptian countryside 
(World Bank, 2004B; p. 2). These schools do help to alleviate the problem of 
illiteracy in Egypt, and despite problems elsewhere, their contributions must be 
acknowledged 
Educating English as Educating Modernity: The Devaluation of Arabic 
 In Bank's push for modernization a larger attempt to cause a cultural shift can 
bee seen in the emphasis on teaching English (World Bank, 1989, p. 22; World Bank, 
1999, p. 72; World Bank, 2003, p. 78). English, as the lingua franca of international 
business, is seen as a gateway to the modern world. Moreover, English is extremely 
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important for those who work in the tourism industry. However, certain linguistic 
issues also arise here. Language contains a number of assumptions about the way the 
world works and the way people think. By emphasizing English, a child gains a 
greater understanding of the world as seen by the country from which the dialect of 
English being taught is taken. Therefore, the emphasis on English can be seen as an 
attempt to “westernize” the educated class. Moreover, within the context of its 
projects, the Bank wishes to emphasize English for the purposes of communication. 
The Bank has little proficiency in colloquial or modern standard Arabic, and it is 
easier for the Bank to communicate in English than it is in Arabic. At best, this is a 
reluctance to learn on the Bank's part. At worst, it is an attempt to colonize the minds 
of Egyptians and make them more amenable to Bank policies and projects. Arabic is 
hardly inadequate to the task at hand and devaluing Arabic devalues the culture that it 
is associated with. Moreover, it is difficult to see what maintaining a tractor has to do 
with speaking English. Adequate Arabic terms exist for almost all of the technologies 
that the Bank wishes farmers to utilize in Egypt. Farmers are perfectly capable of 
meeting their day-to-day challenges and using the Bank's new technologies without 
needing to learn a second language to explain it. English may have value for tourism 
and business, but it is hypocritical for the Bank to demand farmers learn a second 
language whose necessity for their industry is in doubt even as Bank officials fail to 
learn their language. Ultimately English provides a part of a system of inducing 
cultural change in the countryside that should not be overlooked. 
Conclusions: Education and Building a New Egypt 
 In the course of discussing land and moral economy, it becomes clear that 
education is the most important factor. Land reform is meant to bring consolidation. 
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Land reform and other economic policies cause shifts in moral economy. The result is 
is a socially and geographically chaotic transition. Land changes hands, lines are 
redrawn, and the old social order is disrupted. Education remakes the chaos into 
something new. This remains possible because the importance of education does not 
lie so much in the curriculum, but rather in the particular order and ways of thinking 
that students learn in school. Yet these new ways of thinking about themselves and the 
world would not stick without an illustration of their superiority as opposed ot 
previous ways of thinking. Education devalues the old order. Hence education may be 
used ex post facto to justify the chaos and the damage done and to convince people 
that reforms they might have found distasteful are actually for their own good. The 
educational system under the Bank's rubric serves not only as a place to learn to build 
a new Egypt, but it also provides a place where the Bank's actions and policies can be 
justified to entire generations of people. Moreover, with their new educations, 
certificates, and degrees, students will be well-suited to building the Bank's vision of a 
modern country. 
 However, whether or not this scheme is working is debatable. It is difficult to 
tell whether or not land reform has resulted in any form of consolidation. The moral 
economy has been disrupted, but it is unclear what the ultimate result of this 
disruption will be. Moreover, recent reforms have hampered small farmer's ability to 
educate their children effectively, make it even more difficult for the Bank to achieve 
some form of new order. In addition, the Bank's educational projects remain scattered 
across multiple sectors and purposes, and a clear objective beyond vague “educational 
improvement” has not emerged. Possible contributions to the debate by organizations 
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such as the Land Center have often been overlooked by the Bank, as have the Land 
Center's efforts to elucidate the problem of obtaining an education after the new 
reforms. A more deeply integrated and reflexive view of education is needed on the 
Bank's part. There is a need to understand the purposes of education beyond jobs and 
enlightenment. Education is also a means of class-climbing, a part of the moral 
economy, and a means of obtaining a more affluent marriage partner. Knowledge may 
be power for small farmers, but only if they possess the means to access and utilize it 
and the Bank must take this into account. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusions: The Revolution, Alternatives to Adjustment, and a 
Recap 
 
Bank Goals and How the Projects are Sustained: Tying it all Together 
 
 In the course of this project I have described how Bank projects and policies 
resulted in increasing pressures on small farmers. Bank policies have included the end 
of input subsidies and a push for land registration. Though Law 96 was not the Bank's 
idea, they did back it as well. Bank agricultural projects have included irrigation, new 
crops, and factory and large farm development. Bank education projects have 
emphasized the development of a broad general education, engineering, construction, 
service, large-scale farming, and factory skills.  
 The pressures created by Bank policies and liberalization in general have 
resulted in the displacement of many small farmers and shifts in moral economy due 
to pressures on those small and midrange farmers who remain in the countryside. 
Access to basic and higher education has also decreased among small farmers. I also 
described the Bank's use of education as both a means of achieving its goal of 
technological “modernization” and cultural change. Furthermore, I have described 
how the Bank has used its power and influence to emphasize its own system of 
understandings about land, education, and moral economy to force change in the 
countryside in Egypt.  The result has been economic stagnation and an increase in the 
income gap. Those already wealthy and well-placed have reaped large benefits from 
structural adjustment, while the poor and marginalized have become poorer and more 
marginalized.  
 Many attempts have been made to assert that the Bank's goal in Egypt is to 
move small farmers into factory work. Yet the greater goal being sought is somewhat 
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obscure. The Bank never gives a specific goal to reform, aside from a set of neo-
liberal directives. Yet the totality of the projects they have engaged in seem to imply 
that such a goal can be surmised, if not proved conclusively. It can be surmised that 
the World Bank is attempting to transform Egypt into a docile, cheap, and flexible 
client state that provides labor and services for more wealthy nations. Under this 
scheme, Egypt would be an exporter and contractor of legal labor, as opposed to the 
currently more common and risky means of illegal immigration. The labor force's 
docility is achieved by education, which transforms agricultural moral economies into 
wage-labor moral economies, and cheapness and flexibility are achieved by land 
reform and policies which increase pressure on small farmers with the aim  of 
displacement and consolidation.  
 Yet the outcome of the Bank's projects in Egypt remains in question. It is 
debatable whether land consolidation has been achieved by ownership, rental, or at 
all. Moreover, while the increasing pressure on small farmers has resulted in 
displacement in some cases, many remain in the countryside or move to 
administrative centers because there are few jobs in the city. Small farmers are having 
difficulty receiving even basic education due to financial constraints, so the Bank's 
educational project has been stymied.  Egypt is a long way from providing  a source 
of cheap labor and services to the rest of the world, if this a desirable goal at all. 
 The justification for the Bank's project is made through a series of paradoxes. 
Any colonialist implications are masked by “development”. Meanwhile, the capitalist 
empire is built under the mask of modernization. Yet many of the problems are plain 
to see. The obviousness of the 2011 revolution notwithstanding, one need only take a 
seat in a coffeehouse somewhere in Egypt and strike up a conversation to find severe 
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discontent. Yet the Bank has sustained this project through a series of misleading 
statistical measures. First of all, most of the Bank's figures are admitted estimates. 
These admissions litter Bank documents (World Bank, 1994, p. iii; World Bank, 2003, 
p. 66; Adams, 2001, p. 35; World Bank, 2001; p. 36; World Bank, 2010, p. 30; World 
Bank, 2004A, p. 13; World Bank, 2008, p. 29), yet they are accepted as fact because 
they benefit the Bank's projects. Moreover, the devaluation of local knowledge allows 
the Bank to believe that it is helping the ignorant rather than forcing its project on the 
unwilling and unhappy. Yet the Bank projects remain unsustainable, and often result 
in consequences that are entirely unforeseen. Moreover, when failure becomes 
impossible to ignore, the Bank resorts to blaming its interlocutors, including the 
government of Egypt. The World Bank pays little heed to political or equity 
considerations, going even so far as to pressure the government of Egypt to remove 
the bread subsidy. This pressure continues despite the fact that the last time the 
subsidy was removed is still remembered as the bread riots of 1977. Yet when the 
bread subsidies are remembered at all  only political considerations are made. Equity 
and social justice are not even on the table. A disregard for equity and social justice, 
and a relentless drive to produce a docile nation of  workers has resulted in 
impoverished Egyptians and caused the failure of numerous Bank projects.  
 Moreover, the Bank fails to understand organizations like the Land Center or 
even Egyptian farmers because of a lack of real contact. On so-called community-
driven development projects, as averaged from its documents, the Bank makes visits 
to these sites twice a year. The Bank directs mostly top-level organization and does 
some of the initial planning. The remainder of the project is handled by intermediaries 
about whom the Bank complains frequently. Yet without real face-to-face contact on a 
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regular basis, it is difficult to see how the Bank can accomplish anything that is 
actually beneficial to Egyptian farmers. Face-to-face contact is essential, and cannot 
be made up for by any number of intermediaries, now matter how good they are. 
Moreover, the Bank needs to work with organizations, such as the Land Center, that 
are conceptually closer to Egyptian farmers. Though there is no listing of such NGOs 
in Egypt, they are numerous and can be discovered easily by those who are 
sufficiently motivated. These organizations can provide insight, contacts, and support 
which the Bank would otherwise find difficult to acquire. 
Structural Adjustment, Bank Policy, and the 25
th
 of January Revolution 
 
 The Bank seems to see capitalism as creating winners and losers, and seeks to 
create a docile Egypt. Yet if this is the case, the result of the Bank's project in Egypt is 
political instability.. Neither the winners nor the losers are docile. Though the 
revolution cannot be entirely attributed to structural adjustment or Bank policy, their 
part in it cannot be denied. Increasing income gaps and mistreatment of the poor from 
the 1980s onward resulted in years of increasing worker and citizen protests. Then on 
January 25
th
, 2011, the revolution began. Three weeks later Hosni Mubarak stepped 
down. Prominent businessmen are being prosecuted for corruption, while there is talk 
of rolling back many of the measures that had been taken by the Egyptian government 
under Bank advice.  
 Nevertheless, the revolution should not be seen as a negative. Many of the 
reforms have been problematic, damaging, and full of thinly disguised colonial ideas 
about cultural change and local inferiority. The revolution has provided a means to 
finally respond to some of these ideas. Some of the reforms will no doubt be 
transformed, hopefully providing greater equity and ensuring future stability. 
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Alternatives to Neoliberalism and Bank Policy 
 Neoliberalism has been promulgated since the end of the Cold War as the best 
means of reducing poverty. However, the increased income gap and subsequent 
revolution in Egypt have shown us otherwise. Neoliberalism is inequitable, unfair, 
and extremely vulnerable to local corruption. Its application in the environment of 
totalitarian dictatorships where the rich are often cronies of the leadership is 
questionable at best. Indeed, the Bank would find it extremely difficult to push these 
policies within a wealthier, democratic context. The use of dictatorships is arguably 
required by neo-liberalism because no democratically governed people would tolerate 
having their industries devastated and their social safety nets stripped away. 
Moreover, neoliberalism arguably serves core nations far better than it does the 
periphery, by providing them with cheap manufactured goods and labor to answer the 
needs of capital. A better more equitable alternative is required. 
Cooperatives and a More Equitable Alternative 
 Means of development that incorporate the equity of a moral economy are 
available. The World Bank advocates farmers giving up their buffaloes, and then 
buying their milk, butter, and cheese from private sources (World Bank, 1993; p. 42). 
Yet this need not be so. Community-based buffalo farms are also a possibility. If 
aggregated into a community buffalo farm, then everyone can have enough milk, 
butter, and cheese to satisfy their needs, and the excess can be sold at a profit. 
Everyone can be required to provide a certain amount of feed or to care for one 
animal. In turn, the community shares the profits. The possibilities and problems here 
are likely to be many, but the point is that people need not simply give up their own 
buffaloes and commence buying milk and cheese from the market simply because it 
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does not suit the Bank's conception of competitiveness, whatever that might be. There 
are more equitable and profitable opportunities here. 
 Moreover, farmer-led cooperatives provide a great deal of potential, and this is 
something that the Land Center for Human Rights has been pushing for. Under Abdel-
Nasser, the co-ops favored wealthier farmers over poorer ones, and dictated almost 
every aspect of agriculture. After Law 96 of 1992, many farmers were forced out of 
these co-ops as the owner's name was now on the hiaza, or landowner card required to 
sell crops and receive benefits (Bush, 2002; p. 19). Yet these kinds of coops, if truly 
free, do have the capability to provide many benefits. A viable alternative can be 
found by creating a structure in which farmers sell their crops through the co-op and 
share profit and risk. By combining their resources, however small, farmers stand a 
chance at surviving in an open market.  This scheme can be achieved in a number of 
ways. Farmers can put money into the co-op to buy seed, fertilizers, pesticides, and 
herbicides collectively , thus reducing their individual risk by buying from larger 
suppliers with bulk rates. Moreover, the size of a co-op would give additional 
bargaining power to small farmers, giving them a chance to acquire supplies at lower 
rates and to sell crops at more favorable rates. A co-op could remove farmers from the 
mercy of merchants and large landowners and make them able to buy and sell with 
larger more regulated sources. Co-ops are not a perfect solution, but they do provide a 
better one by allowing farmers to act as a single, stronger collective as opposed to 
weaker individuals. 
Land Reform and Counter-Reform 
 Much of the damage from Law 96 has already been done, and it will be 
difficult to reverse. However, it is possible to protect small farmers from further 
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encroachment. Small farmers define their rights to ownership in part by how long they 
have held a particular piece of land. There is a great deal of value in the government's 
allowing small farmers to lay legal claim to land based on length of time and 
improvements that have been made. While this can be tricky to prove, recognizing 
local land rights is the first step in protecting small farmers from further 
encroachment. It is of note that simplifying land titling is a major issue here. As it 
stands, the process goes through three separate ministries (Bush, 2002; p. 21). This 
must change. There is also no reason that the government cannot take some of this 
responsibility itself by subsidizing the process by more bureaucrats or local centers 
where land may be registered. Moreover, some regulation of the remaining rental 
market is necessary to protect small farmers from paying exorbitantly high hunger 
rents and to enforce rental contracts. Enforcement and corruption continue to be 
challenges. 
 Moreover, the removal of subsidies has been damaging to small farmers. Other 
countries routinely subsidize their farming sectors, and Egypt should as well, despite 
Bank contentions. The government can provide incentives to small farmers for 
cultivating certain strategic crops such as wheat instead of simply requiring their 
growth. Offering incentives is more profitable to small farmers and less risky than 
trying to enforce prohibitions or dictates. If a smallholder stands a chance to make 
more money off of crops, then he or she is more likely to grow them. 
Education, Counter-Revolution, and Counter-Counter-Revolution 
 There is little question that primary and secondary education must remain free 
and publicly funded. Bank ideas about demand-side financing, a convenient 
euphemism for making parents pay to send their children to primary and secondary 
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school, overwhelmingly favor the wealthy and must not be enacted. Schools should be 
built in areas that do not have them. Moreover, education should be sensitive to local 
norms and the needs of operating in a wider world. Additional funding should be 
made available so that everyone has a chance to reach higher education, not merely 
those with the means. The underlying assumptions concerning tradition and 
modernity must be re-examined and the cirumstances under which this dialectic is 
sustained must change. This is an abstract and difficult project that may not be 
entirely possible, but the process must begin. Education must become more reflexive. 
Focus should not only be given to technical skills, but to the liberal arts as well. The 
critical thinking skills and intense self-examination involved in the liberal arts can 
provide a great deal of value to the ongoing process of education. Liberal education 
can support ongoing democratization following the revolution. 
Moral Economy and Cultural Norms 
 Unfortunately, there is little that can be done about the changes that have taken 
place in moral economy. Yet culturally sensitive projects are important. The Bank's 
knowledge of the countryside is incredibly limited and its projects have suffered as a 
result. For further projects to have any chance of success, the Bank must learn about 
the people that they claim to serve. First, Bank personnel must learn Arabic. The 
Bank's lack of knowledge in this area is incomprehensible given its own wealth and 
power. Second, before any project is performed, it must be preceded by a study of 
local conditions that goes beyond the mere collection of social facts. True community-
driven development must be encouraged at the individual and household level, while 
simultaneously paying attention to pre-existing relationships. Future projects must 




 Here I return to the title of my thesis and the idea of contested meanings. The 
Bank sees land as a means of production and as a commodity, while the Land Center's 
more expansive view also incorporates land as a means of security, authenticity, and a 
legacy. The Bank mostly recognizes moral economy in the context of risk aversion 
and education as a machine that produces modernity and as a means of producing 
human capital. The Land Center, however, sees education as a means of security that 
is fast fading from small farmers. Overall, the Bank's policies that treat land as a 
means of production and a commodity elevate smallholders unfairly to the level of the 
bourgeoisie and place demands on them that they cannot handle. This irresponsible 
demand can  lead to small farmers losing their land and decrease their ability to 
educate their children. In any case, it almost certainly leads to a decrease in the 
quality of life of small farmers in the countryside. When moral economy is only 
known as risk aversion as opposed to risk management it leads to a neglect of the 
social structure of the countryside and ultimately to its disruption. Education was and 
is the key. By seeing it as both a means of producing human capital and a machine 
that produces modernity, the Bank has begun to use the disruptions its view has led to 
to transform the Egyptian countryside into its vision of modernity. Education has been 
used in an attempt to transform displaced and socially disrupted farmers into docile 
citizens who quietly provide services to wealthier nations. This process has 
overwhelmingly favored the wealthy and further marginalized the poor in part by 
devaluing their ways of life and the meanings they attribute to land, education, and 
moral economy. This process has led to a violent and inequitable process of social 
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change that is far from resolution. Ultimately, it may well end in failure. Given the 
25
th
 of January revolution and the growing backlash against structural adjustment, it is 
reasonable to assume that the Bank's project has been put on hold at least until the 
government stabilizes. Under a more democratic and equitable government, it will be 
difficult for the Bank to push through socially inequitable reforms, because they must 
first go through debate in parliament by officials who will ultimately answer to the 
citizens of Egypt. Inequitable and inaccurate meanings will likely be more difficult to 
propagate as well, because the open process of public debate in a democracy has the 
potential to allow small farmers a more powerful voice. Perhaps, in time, a more 
equitable arrangement will be found. Organizations such as the Land Center for 
Human Rights which are currently active in working towards more equitable 
arrangements for farmers, can provide a start. The World Bank needs to forsake its 
opposition to alternate meanings and make an effort to work with these organizations 
for a more equitable and less colonial future. 
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